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Confidence in the competence of the Court has not been won by
the presence ofan occasional man ofgenius.'
Once in a great while a member of the Supreme Court of
the United States tries to get the last word. "Last word," that is,
in an official sense-a late-breaking opinion issued by a justice
acting as a justice. Not informal last words such as anonymous
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1. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study
in the Federal Judicial System 187 (Macmillan Co. 1928).
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stabs at colleagues via the press,2 or extemporaneous
ejaculations from the bench, 3 or post-retirement disclosure of
changes of heart.4 Official, juridical attempts to get the last word
come in two forms:
1. The surprise opinion, meaning a separate opinion (a
concurrence or dissent) issued by a justice without
reasonable notice to the other justices, after they have
publicly committed themselves to a disposition of the case
that does not, of course, account for the late-breaking
opinion, and
2. See e.g. Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 S. Ct. Rev. 203
(describing the practice); David J. Garrow, The Supreme Court and the Brethren, 18 Const.
Commentary 303 (2001) (same).
3. Compare e.g. Caritativo v. Cal., 357 U.S. 549 (1958), & Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1 (1958), with Alan C. Kohn, Supreme Court Law Clerk 1957-1958: A Reminiscence, 11 J.
Sup. Ct. Hist. 40, 49 (1998) (describing Chief Justice Warren's reaction to opinion read
from the bench by Justice Frankfurter) & Norman Dorsen, The Supreme Court and Its
Justices Fifty Years Ago, 2008 Green Bag Alm. 47, 55-56 (same); see also e.g. David G.
Farrelly, Justice Harlan's Dissent in the Pollock Case, 24 S. Cal. L. Rev. 175 (1951)
(describing on-the-bench conflict between Justices Harlan and Field); Christopher W.
Schmidt and Carolyn Shapiro, Oral Dissenting on the Supreme Court, 19 Wm. & Mary
Bill Rts. J. 75, 95 (2010) (describing Justice McReynolds's famous oral dissent in the Gold
Clause Case, Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), in which he
reportedly said "something to the effect that 'the Constitution has gone! '); Constitution
Gone, Says M'Reynolds, 84 N.Y. Times 1 (Feb. 19, 1935) (noting that Justice
McReynolds's oral delivery of his dissenting opinion came as a "complete surprise,"
summarizing the opinion's content, and describing the reactions of "startled spectators" in
the courtroom).
4. See e.g. Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong, 13 Natl.
L.J. 3 (Nov. 5, 1990) (discussing Justice Powell's October 18, 1990 statement about his
vote in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986): "1 probably made a mistake in that
one.... When I had the opportunity to reread the opinions a few months later, I thought
the dissent had the better of the arguments."); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. 530 (Maxwell Macmillan 1994) (same). Pre-retirement confession of error is permitted.
See e.g. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143-59 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(containing, on page 1145, Justice Blackmun's famous statement: "From this day forward,
I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death."); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 286 n.
1 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("While I joined the Court's opinion in Toolson ... , I
have lived to regret it; and I would now correct what I believe to be its fundamental
error."); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623 (1942) (Douglas, Black, & Murphy, JJ.,
dissenting) ("Since we joined in the opinion in the Gobitis case, we think this is an
appropriate occasion to state that we now believe that it was also wrongly decided."). For a
thoughtful discussion of judicial recantation generally, see Eugene R. Fidell, Judicial
Recantation: Homage to Baron Bradwell, 71 Judicature 259 (Feb.-Mar. 1988).
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2. The surprise revision, meaning a justice's significant
alteration of an opinion after other justices have publicly
committed themselves, presumably at least in part in
reliance on the original version.
As a practical matter, justices who want the last word can
always get it, because there is no stopping them from opining on
whatever they want, whenever they want, even in an official
capacity. But as an equally practical matter, countervailing
forces inside and outside the Court tend to frustrate efforts to get
the last word. A last-word opinion, it turns out, is bad for
everyone. It does not achieve the results sought by its author,
and it does tend to harm the author. And it usually harms the
Court as well. The futility of last-wordism at the Court is
reflected in the apparent shyness of past perpetrators: They do
not make second attempts to get the last word.6 Part I of this
article offers five examples of this last-word dynamic. (As I
explain in Part 1II, there are no very recent examples because the
essential evidence will often be in memories that fade and
eventually disappear and files that tend to be opened to the
public at a time only long (and getting longer) after the event.)
Part II points out similarities among those five cases and
suggests some conclusions that might be drawn from them,
including explanations for the persistence of this sort of
behavior. Part III considers measures the Court or Congress
5. Consider, for example, the practice of some justices of arranging for unofficial
commercial publication of their opinions in chambers in the years before the Court
permitted publication of such opinions in the official United States Reports. Ira Brad
Matetsky, The Publication and Location of In-chambers Opinions, 4 Rapp vi, vi-xv (Pt. 2,
2005); see also Cynthia J. Rapp, In Chambers Opinions by Justices of the Supreme Court,
5 Green Bag 2d 181 (2002). Then there is the intriguing problem-a problem outside the
scope of this article-of the extent to which justices who dissent in one case are bound to
treat the law of that case as binding upon them in later cases "when the answer in the
second case depends on the Court having already answered the initial question that the
baseline dilemma raises." Suzanna Sherry, Justice O'Connor's Dilemma: The Baseline
Question, 39 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 865, 870 (1998).
6. "Apparent" is a necessary qualification because my research has not been
comprehensive. I doubt it could be. In contrast, first-word maneuvers by presidents can
sometimes be quite effective. See M. Elizabeth Magill, The First Word, 16 Win. & Mary
Bill Rights J. 27 (2007).
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might take to prevent these seemingly rare but invariably useless
and harmful frolics.
Before getting down to cases, let us be clear about what is
and what is not a last-word opinion. The crucial term is surprise
-it must be an opinion or revision that comes as a surprise to
the other justices. The definition of "surprise" is, however, a
moving target. An act that would surprise a justice working in
one period of the Court's history (say, for example, the mid-
nineteenth century during the chief-justiceship of Roger B.
Taney) might not have the same effect on a justice working a
century later on a different Court with a different culture. Thus,
a mid-nineteenth-century justice would "silently acquiesce" as a
matter of routine in an opinion delivered without prior
circulation, so long as the general thrust of the opinion was not
inconsistent with what that justice had heard during the Court's
internal "mooting" of the case and the announcement of the
decision in open Court.7 But that same justice would expect an
opportunity to examine and respond to an opinion that was later
revised to add "positions and arguments which are not
recollected as having been propounded from the bench.' In
contrast, by the mid-twentieth century, delivery of an opinion
without prior circulation had become deeply inconsistent with
Court norms.9 At the same time, however, occasional late-
breaking opinions published not only without prior circulation
but also without prior announcement from the bench had
become acceptable, so long as the justice seeking to produce
7. See G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth-
Century Legacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1463, 1469-85 (2006); Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Informing the Public About the US. Supreme Court's Work, 29 Loyola U. Chi. L.J. 275,
283 (1998).
8. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 515 (1849) (Daniel, J., dissenting).
9. See White, supra n. 7, at 1503-05. For an interesting travelogue of the rise of
circulation and the decline of "silent acquiescence," see the docket books in the Morrison
Waite papers at the Library of Congress. Compare e.g. Pace v. Burgess, no. 170, Docket
Book, Chief Justice, October Term, 1875 at 224, in Papers of Morrison Waite, Lib. of
Cong., Manuscript Div., Box 30, with Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372 (1876). In this case, an
opinion for a unanimous Court originally assigned to Justice Hunt was "disapp[roved]" on
April 8, 1876, and then reassigned to Justice Bradley, whose opinion for the Court was
"app[roved]" on April 15 and announced on April 17. See Page v. Burgess in Docket
Book, October Term 1875, supra this note.
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such an opinion received in advance a one-time license from his
colleagues.' 0
In other words, there have always been both conventional
constraints and identifiable exceptions in appropriate
circumstances. Supreme Court justices have, on the one hand,
tended to permit their colleagues some latitude-with just how
much and of what sort varying with the times-when it comes to
delivering opinions without first sharing every word with the
entire Court. But, on the other hand, the justices have never
entirely waived the rarely articulated but jealously guarded right
to what might be called judicial notice and an opportunity to be
heard in concurrence with or dissent from the opinions of their
colleagues." An opinion delivered in violation of the justices'
10. See e.g. Stassen for Pres. Citizens Comm. v. Jordan, 377 U.S. 914 (1964) (Douglas,
J., joined by Warren, C.J., & Goldberg, J., dissenting on May 18 from a decision
announced April 24, "pursuant to the reservation made at the time" that "[o]pinions may be
filed in due course"); Stassen for Pres. Citizens Comm. v. Jordan, in J. of the S. Ct. of the
U.S. (Apr. 24, 1964) at 289 ("The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice
Goldberg dissent. Opinions may be filed in due course."); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
US., 361 U.S. 39, 44 (1959) ("Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan: In joining
the Court's opinion we note our intention to file in due course an amplification of our
views upon the issues involved which could not be prepared within the time limits imposed
by the necessity of a prompt adjudication of this case," and referring to 361 U.S. 39, in
which they issued their opinion on December 7, one month later.); Reconstruction Fin.
Corp. v. Denver & R.G. W R.R., 328 U.S. 495, 536 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissents, and will set forth the detailed grounds for his dissent in
an opinion to be filed hereafter."); F.F. [Felix Frankfurter], memorandum to "Dear
Brethren," June 3, 1946, in Papers of William 0. Douglas, Lib. of Cong., Manuscript Div.,
Box 123 (requesting the accommodation reported with the Reconstruction Finance
decision) [hereinafter "Douglas Papers"]; see also Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198
(1948 & 1949) (Douglas, J., concurring) (indicating that "Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in
the result for reasons to be stated in an opinion.").
This approach has sometimes been followed by the Court as a whole in hurry-up
cases such as Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 154, 155 (1952) (per curiam issued in anticipation of
"a full opinion which, when prepared, will be filed with the Clerk") & 343 U.S. 214 (1952)
(the full opinion, with a dissent by Jackson, J., in which Douglas, J., joined), and Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20 (1942) ("On July 31, 1942, . . . [b]y per curiam opinion, we
announced the decision of the Court, and that the full opinion in the causes would be
prepared and filed with the Clerk."). See also Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and
Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 Geo. L.J. 1, 84
n. 708 (1979) (citing Hirota and Denver & R.G. W. R.R.); Bennett Boskey, Speed and the
Supreme Court, in Bennett Boskey, Some Joys of Lawyering 83-84, 86 (Green Bag Press
2007) (discussing Quirin and Steelworkers).
11. See e.g. Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Earl Warren 299 (Doubleday & Co. 1977)
(noting that "it was our invariable practice not to announce the decision in any case until all
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contemporary understanding of that judicial right would be a
surprise-a last-word opinion.' 2
The justices' prickliness on this subject should come as no
surprise to even a casual observer of the Supreme Court, or of
any court for that matter. After all, as Justice Daniel explained in
a "Note" to his opinion in the Passenger Cases, converting
opinion-writing into a potentially unending game of public
judicial ping-pong would undermine not only the capacity of a
multi-member court to engage in constructive deliberation, but
also the possibility of communicating to the public reliable
explanations of decisions by that court:
In the opinions placed on file by some of the justices
constituting the majority in the decision of this case, there
appearing to be positions and arguments which are not
of our views had been expressed"); cf Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174
(1974) ("The Court observed that notice and an opportunity to be heard [for parties to a
case, not judges] were fundamental requisites of the constitutional guarantee of procedural
due process.").
12. There are other kinds of surprises that the justices can and occasionally do spring
upon one another. One recurring phenomenon is the circulation very close to the end of a
term of draft opinions proposing that the Court either reach a result not anticipated by some
of those who had participated in the deliberations or reach an anticipated result but do so
on unanticipated grounds. See e.g. Felix Frankfurter, Rowoldt v. Perfetto (draft opinion
circulated June 19, 1957) (bearing handwritten notation: "Passed To be argued in 1957
Term"); T.C.C. [Tom Clark], Memorandum to the Conference (June 19, 1957) (indicating
that Justice Clark was then considering a motion "that the case be carried over to next
Term"); F.F. [Felix Frankfurter], Memorandum for the Conference (June 20, 1957)
(proposed per curiam attached), all in Papers of Hugo L. Black, Lib. of Cong., Manuscript
Div., Box 331 [hereinafter "Black Papers"]; Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957)
(noting that case was reargued in October 1957); Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 354 U.S. 934 (1957)
(restoring case to calendar for re-argument); see also e.g. F.F. [Felix Frankfurter],
Memorandum for the Conference (June 12, 1947); Frank Murphy, Memorandum to the
Conference (June 18, 1947); F.F. [Felix Frankfurter], Memorandum for the Conference
(June 18, 1947), all relating to the "lateness" of the opinion for the Court in SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), and all in Douglas Papers, supra n. 10, Box 139;
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 209 (Jackson, J., dissenting, joined by Frankfurter, J.)
(indicating that the Jackson/Frankfurter dissent was issued on October 6, 1947, and that the
opinion of the Court was issued on June 23, 1947).
I thank Stephen Wermiel for emphasizing this kind of behavior. For a modem
example involving Justices William Brennan and Sandra Day O'Connor, and displaying
justices' tendency to denounce and resist it within the confines of the Court, see Seth Stem
& Stephen Wermiel, Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion 534-35 (Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt 2010).
13. On top of which there would be the effect on the parties, who might never know for
certain the outcome of their dispute, or the reasons for it.
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recollected as having been propounded from the bench, and
which are regarded as scarcely reconcilable with the former
then examined and replied to by the minority, it becomes
an act of justice to the minority that those positions and
arguments, now for the first time encountered, should not
pass without comment. Such comment is called for, in
order to vindicate the dissenting justices, first, from the
folly of combating reasonings, and positions, which do not
appear upon the record; and, secondly, from the
delinquency of seeming to recoil from exigencies, with
which, however they may be supposed to have existed, the
dissenting justices never were in fact confronted. It is called
for by this further and obvious consideration, that, should
the modification or retraction of opinions delivered in court
obtain in practice, it would result in this palpable
irregularity; namely, that opinions, which, as those of the
court, should have been premeditated and solemnly
pronounced from the bench antecedently to the opinions of
the minority, may in reality be nothing more than criticisms
on opinions delivered subsequently in the order of business
to those of the majority, or they may be mere afterthoughts,
changing entirely the true aspect of causes as they stood in
the court, and presenting through the published reports
what would not be a true history of the causes decided.
And yet the occasional justice has nevertheless sought the
last word. Why? And what might be done about it?
PART I
There was a time when getting in the last word was, at least
as a formal matter, an unexceptional prerogative of seniority. In
the days of the seriatim opinion at the Supreme Court-1792 to
1800-the justices sometimes delivered individual opinions
14. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 515-16 (Daniel, J., dissenting); see also e.g. J. Catron
to John McLean (May 19, 1837), in Papers of John McLean, Lib. of Cong., Manuscript
Div., Box 10/Reel 5 (confessing that "I feel very sure that but one cause is left me, either
tamely to follow and permit the man to preside in the Court & decide every cause in his
own way, or to act independently of him, with little or no consultation" and expressing a
desire for proceedings in which "the presiding judge consults the judge on the bench in all
cases, and then delivers the conclusions").
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from the bench in reverse order of seniority.' 5 Plainly, this gave
the last justice to speak (either the Chief Justice or, in his
absence, the presiding senior associate justice) the last word.16
But this was not a problem because it surprised no one. That was
simply the way the Court operated, some of the time, and the
justices surely accommodated their deliberative and
communicative processes to this reality. But seriatim opinions
were never the dominant form, and with the arrival of Chief
Justice John Marshall in 1801 they all but disappeared. During
Marshall's chief-justiceship, consensus-or at least, as Professor
White has accurately put it, "silent acquiescence"-was fairly
common. And there does not appear to have been any trouble
with the timing of separate opinions when there were
concurrences or dissents, perhaps because of the widely
recognized collegiality of the Marshall Court's deliberations and
interpersonal relations.17
Marshall's successor, Roger B. Taney-who served as
chief justice from 1836 to 1864-was a jud e who "conduct[ed]
himself with great urbanity and propriety. But he was not in
Marshall's league as a strong judicial leader, being "more
permissive toward dissent and somewhat less astute as a
political statesman."' 9 And so, by 1841 Taney found himself
writing disapprovingly to Richard Peters (the official Reporter
of the Court's decisions) that, "[a] fashion has lately grown up,
to examine after Term, opinions delivered in court, and to write
15. See Natalie Wexler, In the Beginning: The First Three ChiefJustices, 154 U. Penn.
L. Rev. 1373, 1412-18 (2006).
16. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred
Years, 1789-1888, at 17 & 17 n. 92 (U. Chicago Press 1985).
17. See generally e.g. G. Edward White, Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the
Supreme Court of the United States: The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-35
(Macmillan Publ. Co. 1988); Jean Edward Smith, John Marshall: Definer of a Nation
(Henry Holt & Co., Inc. 1996); R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of
the Supreme Court (La. St. U. Press 2001).
18. Joseph Story to Charles Sumner (Jan. 25, 1837), in William W. Story, Life and
Letters of Joseph Story vol. II, 266 (Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 2000) (facsimile of 1851
edition).




answers to them to be published in the reports. It had, in other
words, become acceptable in the Taney Court for the back-and-
forth of opinion formation and memorialization to continue not
only after a decision had been "mooted" among the justices in
private, an opinion announced in court, and a written version
issued, but also right up until the moment the Reporter sent the
collected opinions of the justices for the Term to the printer.
While this was not the same as seriatim opinion delivery-it
lacked the constraining influences of formality, consistency, and
near-simultaneous timing of delivery-it did include one
essential: notice, at least of a general sort. That is, the justices
knew that after an opinion had been delivered in court and the
written version had been turned over to the Reporter for
publication, other members of the Court might step in and draft
separate opinions. Even Taney himself unashamedly engaged in
this practice.2 1
It was in this environment that Justices Henry Baldwin and
John McLean overstepped, surprising and annoying their
colleagues and outside observers of the Court: Baldwin in 1837
by overextending the later-written comment approach, McLean
in 1841 by transferring it to the courtroom itself. Their behavior,
in turn, foreshadowed Taney's own destructive effort in 1857 to
get the last word in Dred Scott v. Sanford.22
Henry Baldwin (1837)
President Andrew Jackson appointed Henry Baldwin of
Pennsylvania to the Supreme Court in 1830, where he served
23until his death in 1844. Baldwin was by all accounts an
accomplished lawyer, but he proved to be an increasingly erratic
20. See Carl B. Swisher, Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court
of the United States: The Taney Period, 1836-64 at 302 (Macmillan Publ. Co., Inc. 1974)
(quoting Roger B. Taney to Richard Peters (Mar. 22, 1841)).
21. See e.g. R.B. Taney to Richard Peters (Mar. 27, 1839), reprinted in Samuel Tyler, A
Memoir of Roger Brooke Taney, LL.D. 307-08 (John Murphy & Co. 1872).
22. 60 U.S. 393 (1857), superseded by U.S. Const. amends. XIII, XIV.
23. See generally Frank Otto Gatell, Henry Baldwin, in The Justices of the United
States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions vol. 1, 313 (Leon Friedman & Fred
L. Israel eds., Chelsea House 1997); Swisher, supra n. 20, at 49.
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24and abrasive colleague during his years on the Court. Just as
importantly for present purposes, he was a failure in matters of
personal finance. By the early 1830s, he was in serious and
deepening financial difficulty as a result of several ill-advised
investments in real estate, as well as other fiscal misfortunes.25
This unstable combination of unpleasant personal
quirkiness and financial stress reached a crescendo of a sort in
the spring and summer of 1837, when Baldwin cornered the
market for some of his own Supreme Court opinions, publishing
them privately, rather than in the Court's official reports
(commonly known as Peters' Reports during this period, after
Peters, the official Reporter). Baldwin distributed his opinions in
the four mortant cases of the January 1837 Term-New
York v. Miln, Poole v. Fleeger, Briscoe v. Bank of
Kentucky,28 and Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge2 9-in a
book titled A General View of the Origin and Nature of the
Constitution and Government of the United States, Deduced
from the Political History and Condition of the Colonies and
States, from 1774 until 1788, and the Decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, together with Opinions in the Cases
decided at January Term, 1837, arising on the Restraints on the
24. Baldwin's less attractive attributes may have been partly a result of some sort of
mental illness. See Carl Brent Swisher, Roger B. Taney 360 (Macmillan Co. 1935)
(describing Baldwin as "at times intellectually unbalanced"); see also Swisher, supra n. 20,
at 218 (quoting Joseph Story to Richard Peters (May 15, 1844)), in Richard Peters
Correspondence, Cadwalader Collection, series 1, box 1, HSP Collection #1454, Historical
Socy. of Pa., Phila., Pa. ("He had generous impulses, but his mind was unhappily organized
for the exercise of the social virtues.")). His quirks and occasional unpleasantnesses did not
make him an ogre. He was, for example, the only member of the Court at Chief Justice
John Marshall's side when he died on July 6, 1835. Swisher, supra n. 20, at 28. See also
Robert D. Ilisevich, Henry Baldwin and Andrew Jackson: A Political Relationship in
Trust? 120 Pa. Mag. Hist. & Biog. 37, 52 n. 48 (Historical Socy. of Pa. Jan./Apr. 1996)
(summarizing Baldwin's erratic behavior).
25. See Swisher, supra n. 20, at 50-52; Smith, supra n. 17, at 510 & 510 n. *
(describing Baldwin's behavior and noting that his "financial difficulties ... eventually
forced him into bankruptcy").
26. 36 U.S. 102 (1837).
27. 36 U.S. 185 (1837).
28. 36 U.S. 257 (1837).
29. 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
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Powers of the States.30 In addition to the four opinions, A
General View contained a lengthy essay by Baldwin on his
views of constitutional interpretation.
There is no evidence that Baldwin ever disclosed to his
colleagues that he was writing opinions in Miln, Poole, Briscoe,
and Charles River Bridge, let alone that he was planning to
publish and sell them on his own. For some, the news may have
come when they first saw the book. Justice Joseph Story
seemingly learned about it from his friend Peters the Reporter,
well after the end of the January 1837 Term.3' Writing from
Boston on May 12, 1837, in reply to a letter from Peters, Story
was "greatly surprized at the course taken by Judge Baldwin." 32
30. (John C. Clark 1837) [hereinafter "A General View"]. There are two versions of A
General View, both dated 1837 and both printed by John C. Clark of Philadelphia. The
differences are in the title pages and in the contents. One has this title: "A General View of
the Origin and Nature of the Constitution and Government of the United States, Deduced
from the Political History and Condition of the Colonies and States, and Their Public Acts
in Congresses and Conventions, from 1774 till 1788, Together with Their Exposition by
the Supreme Court of the United States, and Rules of Construction in Relation to Such
Provisions of the Constitution as Impose Restraints on the Powers of the States." The other
has the title spelled out in the text above. There are several differences between the two
titles, but the presence of "together with Opinions in the Cases decided at January Term,
1837" in the second title is the only significant one for present purposes. The book with the
first title page contains only Baldwin's essay on constitutional interpretation. The book
with the second title page-the "together with Opinions" title page-has three additional
features: Baldwin's opinions in Miln, Poole, Briscoe, and Charles River Bridge, plus an
errata page, plus an index. Records of the Clark printing company show an order by "Judge
Baldwin" for 500 copies of "Comm. on Constitution & Opinions on 4 Cases" on July 15,
1837. Order Book, in Clark & Raser Records, box 2, HSP Collection #1721, Historical
Socy. of Pa., Phila., Pa. (emphasis added). Correspondence between Peters and Story
indicates that Story had a published copy of A General View in hand no later than June 14,
1837. See Joseph Story to Richard Peters (June 14, 1837), in Life and Letters of Story,
supra n. 18, at 273. This combination of (1) changes in title page and contents, (2) a July
17 order for a version with "Opinions on 4 Cases," and (3) evidence that a version of A
General View was in circulation before that order was placed, might be taken to indicate
that Baldwin published an essay-only version of A General View first and then added his
opinions (as well as an index, an errata page, and an updated title page) to a second edition
in July.
31. The Court handed down its last decisions of the Term on February 16. See Anne
Ashmore, Dates of Supreme Court Decisions and Arguments 30 (2006), www.supreme
courtus.gov/opinions/datesofdecisions.pdf (accessed Feb. 21, 2011; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
32. Joseph Story to Richard Peters (May 12, 1837), in Richard Peters Correspondence,
Cadwalader Collection, series 1, Box 1, HSP Collection #1454, Historical Society of Pa.,
Phila., Pa [hereinafter "Peters Correspondence"].
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Conscious, surely, of the doubts readers (including his
colleagues on the Court) would have about his unorthodox
approach to the publication of judicial opinions of a member of
the Supreme Court, Baldwin did offer an explanation for his
new enterprise. In an introductory paragraph to the section of A
General View containing his opinions in Miln, Poole, Briscoe,
and Charles River Bridge he wrote:
It was intended to publish the preceding view [meaning the
essay on the Constitution], with the four opinions ... in an
appendix to the eleventh volume of Mr. Peters' Reports
[the Court's official reports], which contains the opinions
of the Court, and the judges who dissented. But it was
found that, by so doing, the publication of the Reports
would be delayed beyond the time at which they would
otherwise have been before the public. Unwilling to be the
cause of such delay, I have adopted this mode of submitting
my views and opinions to the profession.3 3
This rationale does not ring true, especially when read in light of
contemporary reportorial practice.
At the Supreme Court during the years Baldwin served, a
failure to promptly prepare an opinion for publication in the
Court's official reports-Peters' Reports-was not dealt with
via private publication. When promptness was lacking, the
delayed opinion or opinions simply appeared in a later volume
of Peters'Reports. In 1837, when he published A General View,
Baldwin must have aware of this practice because it had affected
most volumes of Peters' Reports produced since his arrival on
the Court in 1830.
Consider, for examdle, United States v. Clarke3 4 and
United States v. Huertas. They were decided on March 14,
1834, near the end of the Court's January 1834 Term. But
opinions in those cases were not published in 8 Peters (the
eighth volume of Peters' Reports) with the opinions in other
cases decided that Term.36 Instead the opinions in Clarke and
33. A General View, supra n. 30, at 113.
34. 34 U.S. 168 (1835).
35. 34 U.S. 171 (1835).
36. Ashmore, supra n. 31, at 34-35 (listing cases in 8 Peters), 36 (listing cases-
including Clarke and Huertas-in 9 Peters).
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Huertas appeared among the January 1835 Term opinions in 9
Peters, each accompanied by a footnote explaining that "the
opinion was not received by the Reporter until after the
publication of the Reports of the term." 3 A third 1834 opinion
in 9 Peters was accompanied by a note stating simply that "This
case was decided on the 21st of February 1834.' Similarly,
during the January 1831 Term the Court decided Dufau v.
Couprey 's Heirs, but the opinion in the case did not appear in 5
Peters with the opinions in other cases decided that Term.
Instead, it came out in 1832, in 6 Peters.39 Perhaps most
strikingly, during Baldwin's first year as a justice-1830-an
appendix to 3 Peters contained an opinion "prepared by Mr.
Justice Story at February term 1819."4
Arguments of counsel were treated in much the same way,
probably because during Baldwin's time on the Court (and for
many years before and after) the Court's official reports
routinely bundled the justices' opinions with written transcripts
or summaries of the associated arguments of counsel. When a
lawyer who had argued before the Court was late submitting to
the Reporter the write-up of an argument, that too would
sometimes find its way into an appendix or a later volume of the
official reports.41 Indeed, in April 1837, while waiting
impatiently for whatever opinions Baldwin might deliver in time
37. Clarke, 34 U.S. at 168 n. a; Huertas, 34 U.S. at 171 n. a.
38. Field v. U.S., 34 U.S. 182, 203 (1835); see also Ashmore, supra n. 31, at 36
(showing Field to have been reported in 9 Peters, but decided on February 21, 1834).
39. Dufau v. Couprey's Heirs, 31 U.S. 170, 170 n. a (1832) (noting that "[t]his case
was decided at January Term 1831").
40. Trustees of the Phila. Baptist Assn. v. Smith, 28 U.S. 481 (1830) (opinion by Justice
Joseph Story in 1819 case, published in an appendix eleven years later); see also e.g. U.S.
v. Todd, 54 U.S. 52 (1852) ("substance of the decision in Yale Todd's case" on February
17, 1794, inserted as a "Note by the Chief Justice, inserted by order of the Court," fifty-
eight years later); Gordon v. US., 117 U.S. 697 (1885) (1864 opinion by Chief Justice
Roger Taney, published in an appendix twenty-one years later).
41. See e.g. U.S. v. Clarke, 33 U.S. 436, 443 n. a, 705 (1834) ("printed argument" of
counsel "afterwards laid before the court . . . will be found in the appendix to this
volume"); Delassus v. US., 34 U.S. 117, 127 n. a, 765 (1835) (another belated submission
of printed argument of counsel: "The argument of Mr White was not received by the
Reporter when the case was put to press. It will be inserted in the Appendix, should it be
received before the publication of this volume."); Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. 410, 427 n. *,
763 (1838) (same, and noting Reporter's "wish and intention" to insert the argument "in
the report of the case," but indicating that it appeared in the volume's Appendix instead).
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to be included in the 1837 official reports (soon to be 11 Peters),
Reporter Peters was pressing Daniel Webster for a write-up of
Webster's argument in the Charles River Bridge case.42
Thus, the Supreme Court already had a well-established
system for dealing with problems like Baldwin's late opinions in
Miln, Poole, Briscoe, and Charles River Bridge. There was no
need for him to hurry up and go into business selling his
opinions-certainly not for the benefit of the Court itself (which
had its own system for dealing with such things), nor for the
readers of the justices' opinions (who were accustomed to the
Court's system).43
But perhaps this analysis misses the point of Baldwin's
enterprise. Perhaps it was not for the Court or for readers of the
justices' opinions that Baldwin was hurrying his tardy opinions
into print. Perhaps it was for Baldwin himself. Could it be that
he was one of those people who simply cannot bear a long wait
between writing something down and seeing it in print? After
all, none of the late-published opinions discussed above were
Baldwin's. If so, then A General View might have been nothing
more than the first manifestation of a strong personal preference
for speedy publication, or of some other, more obscure urge.
Alas, this explanation does not hold water either. In fact,
Baldwin's behavior before and after the publication of A
General View demonstrated a remarkable lack of interest in
seeing his writing speedily into print, or even in print at all.
Throughout the 1830s, Baldwin would occasionally prepare a
written opinion and then never deliver it to Peters for publication
in the reports, or, apparently, to anyone else for publication
42. Richard Peters to Daniel Webster (Apr. 13, 1837), in Peters Correspondence, supra
n. 32; Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. at 514 n. a (noting that Peters had been "disappointed"
in his "well-founded expectation" of receiving the write-up from Webster); see also
Swisher, supra n. 20, at 84.
43. Generally speaking, the idea that a small delay would generate some sort of
reportorial crisis was nonsense. Those impatient for printed versions of Supreme Court
opinions were wont to publish their own editions, as the Massachusetts legislature did, for
example, with Charles River Bridge. See Life and Letters of Story, supra n. 18, at 272
(reproducing Joseph Story to John McLean (May 10, 1837)).
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anywhere else." In addition, after A General View, he became a
member of the late-opinions-in-the-appendix club.
So, we can add that there was no need for Baldwin to hurry
up and go into business selling his opinions for his own benefit,
because his own track record showed he had no need for speedy
publication. It is, in sum, difficult to believe that Baldwin could
have honestly believed (or expected knowledgeable readers of A
General View to believe) that the necessary or proper course of
action for him to take was to leap into business as a reporter of
decisions as soon as he was late delivering his opinions in Miln,
Poole, Briscoe, and Charles River Bridge.
And in the absence of a plausible justification for
Baldwin's hurrying his opinions into print, it is difficult to resist
the theory advanced by Professor Swisher, who reported in his
Holmes Devise history of the Taney Court (1836-1864) that
Baldwin "published [A General View] as a booklet of his own in
the hope of adding to his income."46 Although there is no direct
44. See e.g. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 597 (1839) ("Mr. Justice Baldwin
delivered an opinion assenting to the judgment of the Court, on principles which were
stated at large in the opinion. This opinion was not delivered to the reporter."); Crane v.
Morris's Lessee, 31 U.S. 598, 621 (1832) ("Mr Justice Baldwin dissented in writing. The
opinion of Mr Justice Baldwin was not delivered to the reporter."); Kelly v. Jackson, 31
U.S. 622, 633 (1832) (same); Lindsey v. Miller's Lessee, 31 U.S. 666, 679 (1832) (same);
see also e.g. Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. 515, 596 (1832) ("Mr Justice Baldwin dissented:
stating that in his opinion, the record was not properly returned upon the writ of error; and
ought to have been returned by the state court, and not by the clerk of that court. As to the
merits, he said his opinion remained the same as was expressed by him in the case of the
Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, at the last term. The opinion of Mr Justice
Baldwin was not delivered to the reporter."). Baldwin was also in the habit of announcing
his dissent and then not delivering an opinion at all. See e.g. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.
591, 698 (1834) (Baldwin, J., dissenting without opinion); Hughes v. Town of Clarksville,
31 U.S. 369, 387 (1832) (same); Leland v. Wilkinson, 31 U.S. 317, 322 (1832) (same);
Green v. Neal's Lessee, 31 U.S. 291, 301 (1832) (same); Page v. Lloyd, 31 U.S. 304, 318
(1831); see also N.J. v. NY., 30 U.S. 284, 291 (1831) ("Mr Justice Baldwin did not concur
in the opinion of the court directing the order made in this cause."); Socy. for Propagation
of Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. 480, 500 (1830) ("Mr Justice Story
delivered the opinion of the Court; Mr Justice Baldwin dissenting on the first point.").
45. See e.g. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 518 (1840) ("Mr. Justice Baldwin
delivered an opinion to the reporter, after the adjournment of the Court; which will be
found in the Appendix, No. ."); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 586 (1840) ("Mr. Justice
Baldwin delivered an opinion to the reporter, after the adjournment of the Court; which
will be found in the Appendix, No. It."); Appendix No. I & Appendix No. II, 39 U.S. 599
& 614 (opinions of Baldwin, J, in Decatur and Holmes).
46. See Swisher, supra n. 20, at 301; see also id. at 51.
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evidence to support Swisher's conclusion, it is quite plausible
given Baldwin's difficult financial situation and his incredible
rationale for producing A General View.
To the extent that making money was indeed Baldwin's
objective, he failed. Sales of A General View were
disappointing, and there was no sequel, which might be
expected if the cash-strapped justice had made out well on his
first effort.4 7
And if-implausible as it is-hurrying his opinions into
print was Baldwin's objective, he failed there as well. A General
View seems to have come out at roughly the same time as 11
Peters. Correspondence between Peters and Story at the time
indicates that Story received his printed copies of 11 Peters and
A General View at about the same time, in early June of 1837.48
As a member of the Court, a friend of Peters, and a colleague of
Baldwin, Story would have been among the first to receive each
volume. Years later, Justice James M. Wayne, who had been on
the Court with Baldwin in 1837, recalled that Baldwin's opinion
in Miln had been "accidentally excluded from [Peters's official]
report, without the slightest fault in the then reporter of the court
or in the clerk" and had instead appeared "contemporarily with
the publication of the reports, in his View of the Constitution."4 9
47. Id. at 51 (citing Henry Baldwin to John Cadwalader (Dec. 19, 1838)), in
Cadwalader Papers). In 1836 Baldwin had made what was apparently an equally
unsuccessful foray into the commercial publication of his opinions on circuit. Id.
48. Joseph Story to Richard Peters (June 14, 1837), in Life and Letters of Story, supra
n. 18, at 273.
49. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 430, 432 (1849) (Wayne, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). Wayne's recollection of Miln might be read to excuse the late delivery by Baldwin
of a separate opinion in that case on the ground that Baldwin did not realize that the
majority opinion or Story's dissent would be objectionable to him in some respects until
the last day of the Term. See id. at 431-32; see also Currie, supra n. 16, at 205
n. 19. But accommodating that sort of circumstance was exactly the function of an
appendix or subsequent-volume publication in Peters' Reports. See text accompanying
notes 34-43, supra. And in any event the Miln story cannot explain Baldwin's late-
breaking opinions in the other three cases, which were argued and announced well before
the end of the Term, at least by contemporary standards. Ashmore, supra n. 31, at 38
(showing dates of decision for cases reported in 36 U.S.). Furthermore Baldwin had time to
write during the January 1837 Term, because he was not overworked. He had written one
short opinion for a unanimous Court, and one dissent. Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41 (1837);
Livingston' Executrix v. Story, 36 U.S. 351, 393 (1837) (Baldwin, J., dissenting). His six
colleagues had carried the rest of the opinion-writing load. Finally, Charles River Bridge
had been argued once already in 1831, and had been sitting on the Court's docket awaiting
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Baldwin did publish A General View with another
unspoken but obvious objective. In the introduction, Baldwin
goes on at some length about the utility, superiority, and
importance of his version of the compact theory of federal
constitutional law.50 This is unexceptional. It is what we expect
our judges to do: write to explain why their decisions in cases
are correct. There is no need to go deeply into the subject here,
however, because A General View was a near-perfect failure as a
vehicle for promoting Baldwin's jurisprudence.
A General Vie-the essay and the four opinions-was
largely ignored by Baldwin's contemporaries on and off the
Court,5  and neither the essay nor any of the opinions has been
cited in a Supreme Court opinion since Justice John Catron's
"far-fetched" opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford in 1857.52 At
only one other time did the Court pay any attention to A General
View-in the Passenger Cases in 1849. On that occasion the
primary subject was not Baldwin's thinking about the
Constitution, but, rather, the inability of two members of the
Court to agree on the significance of his strange choice to
publish his opinions-particularly Miln-in A General View,
rather than in 11 Peters. In his solo concurrence in the
a full Court to reconsider the case ever since. (A divided Court had ordered re-argument.)
Baldwin had had half-a-dozen years in which to document his views in Charles River
Bridge, and thus it is perhaps to be expected that of the four opinions published in A
General View, the opinion in Charles River Bridge is the longest and by far the most
replete with copious citations to authorities. Compare Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge (opinion of Baldwin, J.), in A General View at 134-69 (thirty-five pages long, and
chock-full of citations to a wide variety authorities), with Briscoe, Poole, and Miln
(opinions of Baldwin, J.), in id at 113-34, 170a-181, 181-97 (twenty-one, thirteen, and
sixteen pages, respectively, and relatively free of citations to authorities).
50. A General View, supra n. 30, at 1.
51. Some observers at the time recognized Baldwin's book for what it was-a private
production of his judicial opinions in the Supreme Court, see e.g. Constitutional
Jurisprudence, Am. Jurist & L. Mag. 239, 239-44 (Apr. 1838); Supreme Court of the
United States, N.Y. Rev. 372 (Apr. 1838), while others simply ignored it, see e.g.
Constitutional Law, 46 N. Am. Rev. 126 (Jan. 1838) (reviewing 11 Peters, discussing at
length divisions on the Court, and noting Baldwin's dissent in Livingston v. Story, but
completely ignoring A General View); but see The Supreme Court of the United States: Its
Judges and Jurisdiction, U.S. Mag. & Democratic Rev. 143, 150 n.* (Jan. 1, 1838) (citing
approvingly to Baldwin's "very able, but rather angry, tract").
52. 60 U.S. 393, 522, 528 (1857) (Catron, J.); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: Article IV and Federal Powers, 1836-1864, 1983 Duke L. J. 695, 734
(noting that "Catron had two far-fetched theses of his own, which nobody else joined").
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Passenger Cases, Justice Wayne invoked Baldwin's decision to
publish an opinion on Miln in A General View as evidence of
Baldwin's hostility to the Miln majority's relatively broad (for
the time) definition of commerce subject to congressional
regulation, while Chief Justice Taney in his solo dissent
preferred to rely on Baldwin's officially reported concurrence in
Groves v. Slaughter:
And I have the strongest reason to suppose that Mr. Justice
Baldwin had become satisfied, because, in his opinion in
Groves v. Slaughter, he quotes the case of New York v.
Miln with approbation, when speaking in that case of the
difference between commercial and police power. The
passage is in 15 Pet. 511, where he uses the following
language:-"The opinion of this court in the case of Miln v.
New York, 11 Pet. 130, &c., draws the true line between
the two classes of regulations, and gives an easy solution to
any doubt which may arise on the clause of the constitution
of Mississippi which has been under consideration." I quote
his words as judicially spoken, and forming a part of the
official report.54
The third edition of 11 Peters, published in 1882, included
Baldwin's four opinions, inserted in the appropriate places next
to the majority and dissenting opinions in Miln, Poole, Briscoe,
and Charles River Bridge. And in 1883 the Lawyers Co-
operative Publishing Company reprinted A General View in its
entirety in Book 9 of the Lawyers Edition case reports. Neither
development did anything to enhance the nonexistent influence
of A General View. It was dead to history in general and the
Court in particular. Even the Library of Congress, which held
three copies of Baldwin's Third Circuit reports, held just one
copy of A General View.55 Thereafter, Baldwin's opinions in A
General View escaped reported citation by any court for almost
56150 years. A General View was and remains a neutrino of
53. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 430, 432 (1849) (Wayne, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 489-90 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
55. See Catalogue of the Library of Congress 649-51, 872 (Lemuel Towers 1861)
(showing three copies of the Circuit reports among listings for "American Reports," and
one copy of A General View among listings for "Government").
56. See Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. US., 54 Fed. Cl. 630, 633 n. 5 (2002); see
also David P. Currie, The Most Insignficant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. Chi. L.
246
THE LAST WORD
constitutional jurisprudence, passing through scores of years and
hundreds of volumes of judicial opinions without leaving a
notable trace.
And what of the impact of A General View within the
Supreme Court itself?
Having failed to save time, turn a buck, or advance his
vision of constitutional law, Baldwin did achieve one thing: He
managed to sabotage his relationship with Story, by consensus
one of the finest minds and kindest people ever to sit on the
Court. A General View was in substantial part a rather harshly
worded attack on the constitutional jurisprudence developed by
Story and Marshall during the first third of the nineteenth
century. And Baldwin explicitly and repeatedly targeted Story's
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States.17 Story
was resigned (and somewhat bitterly so) to his own declining
influence on the Court and to the rise of Taney and the other
Jacksonians, but he nevertheless managed to maintain good,
even generally friendly and constructive relations with his newer
colleagues.58 But he was clearly hurt and angered by the
intensity and tone of Baldwin's hostility in A General View. The
normally forgiving Story wrote to Peters in May of 1837 that
[a]s a Judge, and as a Man, I should think his course in
regard to the court, & a fortiori in regard to myself
personally as not only indefensible, but without excuse....
His animadversions upon my commentaries on the
Constitution in a distinct & independent work offered
matter for very different consideration. I neither court nor
Rev. 466, 480 (1983) (mentioning Baldwin, but not A General View). A General View even
escaped inclusion in several of the leading summaries of the work of Supreme Court
reporters during the intervening years. See e.g. Hermann Henry Bernard Meyer, List of
Works Relating to the Supreme Court of the United States (Govt. Printing Off. 1909); John
William Wallace, The Reporters, Arranged and Characterized, with Incidental Remarks
(4th ed. Soule and Bugbee 1882); but see Charles C. Soule, The Lawyer's Reference
Manual of Law Books and Citations 4 n. 7 (Soule and Bugbee 1883) (correcting a
reference in the New York Law Institute Library to A General Review as "Baldwin's
Appendix to 11 Peters," noting that "[t]his title, while substantially correct, is misleading");
cf Bennett Boskey, Dissenting Opinions: An Addendum to Justice Scalia's Observations,
in Boskey, Joys of Lawyering, supra n. 10, at 52-54 (describing a salute to Baldwin by
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone).
57. See e.g. A General View at 108-12; see also R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court
Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic 219, 311 (U.N.C. Press 1985).
58. See Newmyer, supra n. 57, at 306-16.
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fear those animadversions, whatever they may be. He must
settle with himself the question of the decorum & propriety
of them, situated as we are, on the same Bench, as a
volunteer critic. When the proper time shall arrive I shall
consider what is the just course for me to pursue in reply
"without fear, favor, or hope of reward, & without envy,
hatred or malice", like a grandjur7man. I promise nothing
and restrain myself as to nothing.
In June, Story was still upset, although his expression of it
was more restrained. He told Peters he had read "the pamphlet
of Baldwin ... without surprise, and without any unsuitable
emotion," leaving the reader to guess at what emotion might be
suitable, but providing a clue in the next line:
I have no reply to make to it. I have no desire to make any;
and I shall not trust myself to make but a single comment
on it. Our late friend, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, approved
all the doctrines in the Commentaries on the Constitution.
Under such circumstances, I am quite consoled, although
another Judge disapproves them.60
Coming from Story, even those were strong words.61 Thus,
it seems likely that Baldwin undermined his relationship with
Story, and perhaps other colleagues as well, with his publication
of A General View.62
Assessing the impact of A General View on the Court as an
institution is impossible, because the book has been all but
invisible there. To the extent that A General View garbled the
precedential value of the Court's decisions in any of the four
59. Joseph Story to Richard Peters, supra n. 32.
60. Life and Letters of Story, supra n. 18 (reproducing Joseph Story to Richard Peters
(June 14, 1837)); see also Gerald T. Dunne, Joseph Story and the Rise of the Supreme
Court 364-65 (Simon and Schuster 1970).
61. In his Life and Letters ofJoseph Story, supra n. 18, Story's son reports that, "[t]he
only circumstances which at all threatened to interrupt the agreeable personal relations of
all the Judges, was a publication [A General View], by Mr. Justice Baldwin, in which some
severe strictures were made upon the Commentaries on the Constitution. My father,
however, took no notice of it." Id. at 273. While the June 14 letter to Peters might plausibly
be characterized as Story p6re nobly holding himself above the fray, the same cannot be
said for the heated May 12 letter. How does Story fils deal with this? By leaving the May
12 letter, and any mention of it, out of the Life and Letters of Joseph Story. Perhaps a less
partial collection of Joseph Story's letters is in order.
62. See e.g. Newmyer, supra n 57, at 219.
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cases-as it appeared to do with Miln when Taney and Wayne
wrangled over it in the Passenger Cases-it was harmful to
some limited extent. And to the extent that it offered some small
increment of intellectual aid and comfort to pro-slavery forces
on and off the Court-as it appeared to do for Catron in Dred
Scott-it was at least a small evil. It may also have contributed
to the gradual breakdown of collegiality on the Taney Court that
led in turn to the last-word stunts executed by McLean in
Groves v. Slaughter in 1841 and Taney in Dred Scott v.
Sandford in 1857.
John McLean (1841)
Unlike Justice Baldwin, Justice John McLean did not want
to turn the last word into cash. He seems to have wanted to turn
it into power. Another Jackson appointee, McLean served on the
Court from 1830 to 1861.63 Although he was a steady
contributor to the work of the Court, he was perennially and
obviously interested in the Presidency, earning himself the
uncomplimentary sobriquet, "The Politician on the Supreme
Court."6 It was in this mode that he made a scene in court with
an opinion he had concealed from his colleagues until he was
ready for a dramatic delivery. While there is no direct evidence
of McLean's purpose, the context suggests that his surprise oral
delivery of an opinion in Groves v. Slaughter was, in effect
and in intent, a campaign speech.
Groves involved a dispute over a provision of the
Mississippi constitution that prohibited the importation of slaves
for sale. The parties imagined that the Court would enter the
heated nationwide debate over the relative constitutional powers
63. See generally Francis P. Weisenburger, The Life of John McLean: A Politician on
the United States Supreme Court chs. XI-XIV (Da Capo Press 1971) (reprint of 1937
edition); see also Frank Otto Gatell, John McLean, in The Justices of the United States
Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions, supra n. 23, at 300-12.
64. See e.g. Allen Sharp, Justices Seeking the Presidency, 29 J. S. Ct. Hist. 286, 288-92
(2004); see also Alan F. Westin, Out-of-Court Commentary by United States Supreme
Court Justices, 1790-1962: Of Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 633,
638-40 (1962).
65. 40 U.S. 449 (1841).
66. Id. at 450-51.
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of the states and the federal government to regulate slavery, and
presented their cases accordingly.6 7 Oral arguments in Groves
extended over seven days in February 1841, and were
immediately followed by six days of argument in the famous
Amistad case.68 The two cases attracted a great deal of public
attention.6 9
On March 9 Justice Story announced the decision and
opinion of the Court in the Amistad case (Justice Baldwin
dissenting without delivering an opinion), and on March 10
Chief Justice Taney7 o did the same in Groves. Taney-and all of
his colleagues save McLean-apparently believed that Taney's
opinion for the Court was the only one that would be delivered
that day, and that the dissenters (Justices Story and John
McKinle would follow the same course that Baldwin had in
Amistad. The Court had decided Groves narrowly, on state-law
grounds not directly related to the slavery issue, and the case
appeared to be heading to an anticlimactic conclusion. 72 But
when Taney had finished reading the opinion of the Court,
"Judge McLean took from his pocket and read a counter-
opinion, unexpectedly to the other Judges, to which Judges
Thompson, Baldwin, and McKinley severally replied, each
differing from all the others." 73
67. Id. at 452-96.
68. U.S. v. Libellants ofSchooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841); Ashmore, supra n. 31,
at 43.
69. See e.g. The Diary of Philip Hone 1828-1851 vol. 2, 61-62 (Bayard Tuckerman,
ed. Dodd, Mead and Co. 1889) (mentioning Amistad); Charles Warren, The Supreme Court
in United States History: Volume Two 1836-1918 at 68-70 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1926)
(describing audience for Groves argument).
70. Or perhaps Justice Smith Thompson- the record is not entirely clear on this point.
See Swisher, supra n. 20, at 368.
71. Story was not even in Court on March 10. His correspondence about the case and
McKinley's behavior described in the text above suggest that neither justice had planned to
deliver an opinion of any sort, orally or in writing. See Swisher, supra n. 20, at 367-68
(quoting Joseph Story to R.J. Walker (May 22, 1841)).
72. 40 U.S. at 503.
73. Swisher, supra n. 20, at 51 (quoting 10 Memoirs ofJohn Quincy Adams 442 (1874-
77) (Charles F. Adams, ed.)); see also David L. Lightner, The Supreme Court and the
Interstate Slave Trade: A Study in Evasion, Anarchy, and Extremism, 29 J. S. Ct. Hist. 229,
240-42 (2004) (noting among other things that the justices' "views were so diverse as to
make agreement impossible," and characterizing as "evident" the other justices' surprise at
McLean's announcing his opinion).
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One can only imagine the heat and turmoil of the judicial
exchange, with Thompson, Baldwin, and McKinley-all
unprepared for McLean's surprise opinion-chiming in
extemporaneously, in open court. Ripples appear clearly in the
published opinions of Taney and Baldwin, and to a lesser extent
in the final version of the opinion of the Court, published under
74
Justice Smith Thompson's name.
Like Baldwin in A General View, McLean in Groves v.
Slaughter had given his colleagues something they apparently
had never seen before-in this case an opinion delivered in court
(rather than in print) without fair warning. Unlike Baldwin,
however, McLean was not trying to corner the market on his
opinions for pecuniary gain. Rather, McLean appeared to be
seeking maximum public attention for his views on an important
issue of the day-slavery--even though those views were, as
McLean freely conceded, "not necessary to a decision of the
case." 75 Publishing those views in an end-of-term pamphlet
would not generate the same attention as would declaiming them
in a courtroom crowded with Washington luminaries and
politicos.76 As McLean went on to explain, "under existing
circumstances, I deem it fit and proper to express my opinion"
on the power of states to regulate slavery within their borders.77
At a very general level, the "circumstances" to which
McLean was referring might be supposed to have been the very
existence of slavery in the United States, to which he was
sincerely opposed, and which all today would agree deserved to
be resisted at every turn. But although McLean had been active
in public life since 1812 and had during that time made many
statements against slavery in speeches, editorials, and public
correspondence, he had never before done so from the bench in
this manner, despite having heard many slavery-related cases.
Why now? Because the "circumstances" must have had a
narrower meaning, and there was just one obvious candidate: At
74. 40 U.S. at 508 (Taney, C.J.); id. at 510; id. at 503 (Thompson, J.). McKinley's
opinion was not published.
75. 40 U.S. at 504 (McLean, J.).
76. Baldwin's experience four years earlier had surely demonstrated that!
77. 40 U.S. at 504 (McLean, J.).
78. See generally Weisenburger, supra n. 63.
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the time, McLean was engaged in early maneuvering to succeed
President William Henry Harrison, the newly elected but aged
President who was not expected to run for a second term.79
McLean's political base was in Ohio, and despite the fact that
Groves was a case about a provision of the Mississippi state
constitution, McLean's opinion dwelt on the enlightened laws
and prudent exercise of state sovereignty by the good people of
Ohio.8 0 Moreover, while his opinion in Groves-the gist of
which was that slavery was purely a creature of state law-
enthusiastically stroked the voters of Ohio (where there was
strong sentiment for state power to exclude slavery), it was
written in a way that also made it appealing to many pro-slavery
southerners who could read it as a vindication of their states'
rights a Proach to protecting slavery within their own states'
borders. McLean's opinion was, in other words, not a strong
statement of noble abolitionist views, but rather the
constitutional trimming of a politician seeking to please both the
northern and southern sections of an increasingly divided polity.
McLean would later say that his purpose and achievement
in Groves was to settle the question of state versus federal power
over slavery, but the emptiness of this claim was obvious to both
his enemies and his friends. 82 No justice had joined his opinion
in Groves (after such an obnoxious delivery, even a colleague
who agreed with every word of it would have been inclined and
well-advised to concur separately), and the constitutional issues
it raised were not resolved until the ratification of the thirteenth
amendment to the Constitution. And the opinion and its
unorthodox delivery did not contribute to a presidential
nomination, which never came.
The Groves incident had negative effects as well, for
McLean and for the Court. McLean's concession that he was
reaching beyond matters "necessary to a decision of the case"
provided ammunition to political opponents in presidential
79. Harrison would die just a few days after Groves was decided, to be succeeded by
John Tyler.
80. 40 U.S. at 507-08 (McLean, J.).
81. See Warren, supra n. 69, at 72.
82. See Weisenburger, supra n. 63, at 140-41.
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politics and to critics of his performance as a justice.8 3 It also
offended, at the very least, four members of the Court, and
triggered the publication of a confusion of opinions. And it
probably contributed to the paranoid strain in Taney's dealings
with the Court in the Dred Scott case (described in the next
section of this article). After all, it was in response to McLean's
surprise opinion in Groves that Taney determined to delay until
the last minute delivery to Peters of the final written version of
his own opinion in the Dred Scott case, in order to prevent any
other member of the Court from reading and commenting on it
84in yet another surprise opinion.
Like Baldwin, McLean apparently learned his lesson.
Despite serving for two more decades on the Court, during
which his personal campaign for a presidential nomination never
ended and the opportunities to deliver additional surprise
opinions were numerous, McLean never again treated the bench
as a stump.
Roger B. Taney (1857)
Roger Taney, yet another Jackson appointee, served as
Chief Justice of the United States from 1836 to 1864.5 He
sought the last word in the infamous Dred Scott case not for
money or power, but, rather, to prevail over Justice Curtis.
Taney delivered his "opinion of the court" in Dred Scott on
March 5, 1857,6 and Curtis delivered a devastating dissent the
next day. By seeking to rewrite his "opinion of the court"
without giving Curtis a chance to revise his dissent, Taney
implicitly acknowledged both the depth of his desire to win the
battle of legal reasoning in Dred Scott and the power of Curtis's
opinion. The sequence of events that followed reveals the
lengths to which Taney was willing to go in order to get the last
83. See id.
84. See Swisher, supra n. 20, at 302 (citing Roger B. Taney to Richard Peters (Mar. 22,
1841)).
85. See generally Swisher, supra n. 20.
86. The tangle of arguments in the opinions of the justices who supported the outcome
in the case (the holding that Dred Scott was a slave) makes debatable the number of
justices who joined in many of parts of Taney's opinion, as well as the opinions of Justices
Campbell, Catron, Daniel, Grier, and Nelson. See Currie, supra n. 16, at 267-73.
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word:8 7
March 5-Taney delivers his "opinion of the court."
March 6-Curtis delivers his dissent.
March 14-Having learned that Taney is revising his
"opinion of the court," Curtis notifies Clerk of the Court
William T. Carroll that his dissent should not be submitted
for official publication until he has a chance to review the
revised opinion.
April 2-Curtis requests from Carroll a copy of Taney's
revised opinion.
April 6-Taney, with the support of Justices Wayne and
Daniel, issues an order to Carroll to "give no copy of this
[Taney's] opinion to any one, until the reporter has printed
it." Carroll notifies Curtis of the order and suggests that
Curtis request a copy of Taney's opinion from the author.
April 9-Curtis suggests to Carroll that the Taney-Wayne-
Daniel order could not apply to a member of the Court, and
that Carroll should consult with Taney.
April 14-Carroll replies to Curtis that he did consult with
Taney after sending the April 6 letter to Curtis, and that
Taney approved of withholding the "opinion of the court"
from Curtis.
April 18-Curtis writes to Taney, asking him to instruct
Carroll to send Curtis a copy of the "opinion of the court."
April 28-Taney refuses to do so.
May 13-Curtis replies to Taney expressing, among other
things, concerns about the relationship between Taney's
revised "opinion of the court" and Curtis's original dissent
that echo Daniel's "Note" in the Passenger Cases:8 8
In my judgment, and I cannot doubt you will agree
with me, a judge who dissents from an opinion of a
majority of the court upon questions of constitutional
87. All of the documents quoted in this timeline are reprinted in George Ticknor Curtis,
The Dred Scott Case, as Remembered by Justice Curtis's Family, 10 Green Bag 2d 213,
225-38 (2007) (including an explanation that the text is "[a]n Abridged and Illustrated
Excerpt from a Memoir of Benjamin Robbins Curtis, LL.D. (1879)").
88. Which might inspire some wonder as to whether Daniel appreciated the irony of his




law which deeply affect the country, discharges an
official duty when he lays before the country the
grounds and reasons of his dissent. This opinion of
the court was read in conference of all the judges. I
shaped my dissent from that opinion accordingly.
After I returned home, I was informed that this
opinion had been revised and materially altered. I did
not know whether the information was true or false. I
thought I had a right to know, before my own opinion
should be published by the reporter in a permanent
form, whether any alterations material to my dissent
had been made after its promulgation from the bench.
Late May-The official report of Dred Scott v. Sandford is
published in 19 Howard.
June 11-Taney replies to Curtis denying, among other
things, that he has revised his "opinion of the court," but
only by taking the laughably warped position that support
for conclusions reached in an opinion do not count as
revisions:
There is not one historical fact, nor one principle of
constitutional law, or common law, or chancery law,
or statute law, in the printed opinion, which was not
distinctly announced and maintained from the bench;
nor is there any one historical fact, or principle, or
point of law, which was affirmed in the opinion from
the bench, omitted or modified, or in any degree
altered, in the printed opinion. You will find in it
proofs and authorities to maintain the truth of the
historical facts and principles of law asserted by the
court in the opinion delivered from the bench, but
which were denied in the dissenting opinions. And
until the court heard them denied, it had not thought it
necessary to refer to proofs and authorities to support
them; regarding the historical facts and principles of
law which were stated in the opinion as too well
established to be open to dispute. But you will find
nothing altered, nothing in addition but proofs to
maintain the truth of what was announced and
affirmed in the opinion delivered.
June 16 and 20-Curtis and Taney close their
correspondence with a chilly final exchange of letters.
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Curtis never did get to see a copy of Taney's revised
opinion before it appeared in 19 Howard, and he later
complained that Taney's revisions "amount[ed] to upwards of
eighteen pages. No one can read them without perceiving that
they are in reply to my opinion."89 In his thorough study of the
Dred Scott case, Professor Fehrenbacher concludes that Curtis's
complaint was well-founded. Taney expanded his opinion by at
least twenty-five percent, and probably more like fifty percent,
in response to Curtis's dissent (and, to a lesser extent, in
response to a dissent by Justice McLean). Thus, "Taney's denial
of having made any significant changes, though perhaps not
untruthful according to his own peculiar lights, must be labeled
inaccurate."90
According to Taney, this exercise in secret revision and
publication without rebuttal was necessary in order to achieve
two ends. First, to add "proofs and authorities ... regarding the
historical facts and principles of law which were stated in the
opinion as too well established to be open to dispute," but which
Curtis had contested and which Taney speaking for the Court
must therefore settle by spelling out the obvious. Second, that
justice to [the Court] itself required that the opinion in this
case should be reported and brought before the public under
the usual supervision and responsibility of the officer
appointed by the court to perform that duty; and that it
ought not to be separated from all of the other opinions
delivered by the court during the term, and hurried before
the public in an unusual manner, by irresponsible reporters,
through political and partisan newspapers, for political and
partisan purposes." 92
Taney surely failed in his first objective. He did not specify
the obviousnesses for which he was adding authorities, but the
constitutional status of slavery obviously remained "open to
dispute" after the eventual appearance of Taney's "opinion of
the court," even with its additional proofs and authorities. In
addition, even if one were to take at face value Taney's claim
89. Curtis, supra n. 87, at 237.
90. Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case 320 (Oxford U. Press 1978).
91. Curtis, supra n. 87, at 232.
92. Id. at 227.
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that his additional proofs and authorities overcame Curtis's
points in dissent, Taney failed to even try to rebut some
arguments in Curtis's opinion. 93
He failed in his second objective as well. First, because his
decision to withhold his "opinion of the court" did nothing to
improve the accuracy of reporting on the opinion-in fact it did
the opposite, because for several weeks the only available
version of the opinion was drawn from the notes of an
Associated Press reporter who was in court when Taney had
read his original opinion. Second, because hurrying before the
public the opinion of the court and any separate opinions by
individual justices was a matter of tradition and routine in high-
profile cases. Thus, for example, Taney had made no objection
when his opinion in the Charles River Bridge case was printed
in pamphlet form before the official reporter was available, even
though it was for the use of a hostile Massachusetts legislature.94
In fact, by the time the official report of the Dred Scott opinions
appeared in volume 19 of Howard's Reports, several of the
opinions in the case-including the separate opinion of Justice
Daniel, who had signed Taney's April 6 sequestration order-
were already in print. 95
The bottom line for Taney in Dred Scott was that
withholding his opinion from Curtis and the rest of the world
while he tried to revise it in answer to Curtis's dissent did not
work, either as a substantive matter or as a matter of public
relations. And, like the earlier last-word efforts of Baldwin and
McLean, Taney's maneuvering harmed him and harmed the
Court. It was, in Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes's famous
characterization, a "self-inflicted wound" to the institution of the
Court, and to Taney.96 It had other and immediate negative
effects. After their acrimonious exchange of letters, Curtis
resigned from the Court. Curtis claimed he was motivated by the
need to earn more money to provide for his family, but few
93. See e.g. Currie, supra n. 16, at 272 (discussing Curtis's treatment of Taney's due
process argument).
94. See supra n. 43.
95. See Swisher, supra n. 20, at 640-41.
96. Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 50 (Columbia U.
Press 1928).
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believed that rationale at the time, or do today, and he made
clear in his correspondence thereafter that his departure was the
contemporary judicial equivalent of a modem noisy
withdrawal.9 One of the finest lawyers of the nineteenth
century, Curtis was a major contributor to the work of the Court
even as a junior justice who served for a mere six years.9 8 He
was replaced by one of the weakest justices of the time, Nathan
Clifford.99 Surely that change did the Court no good.
For Taney, the struggle for the last word did not end with
the publication of opinions in 19 Howard. He continued to
agonize over the case, the opinions, and the public reaction to
them. In September of 1858, more than a year after he had
sanctimoniously lectured Curtis about the impropriety of
untimely, staggered release of opinions in Dred Scott, Taney
wrote a thirty-page supplement to his opinion in the case and
sought to have it published in the official reports. 00 This was
too much even for the justices who had supported his initial last-
word maneuvering against Curtis. The Court rejected Taney's
Dred Scott II opinion, 0 and he was left to appeal to his heirs to
publish it in some other way.102 Even if Taney was blind to the
lessons of his effort to get the last word, his colleagues were not.
97. See Stuart Streichler, Justice Curtis in the Civil War Era: At the Crossroads of
American Constitutionalism 148-49 (University of Va. Press 2005). Quitting was, of
course, not Curtis's only option, even if he was disgusted with the handiwork of the Chief
Justice and a majority of his colleagues. Curtis might have better served the country, as
well as the rule of law in which he fervently believed, by carrying on. Cf Jeffrey Toobin,
The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court 177 (Doubleday 2007) (offering
an unsupported-and apparently unverifiable, as Toobin cites no authority-report that in
the wake of the Bush v. Gore case, Justice David Souter "seriously considered resigning").
98. See Currie, supra n. 52, at 728-38, 744-45; David P. Currie, The Constitution in
the Supreme Court: Contracts and Commerce, 1836-1864, 1983 Duke L. J. 471, 506-13.
99. See Currie, supra n. 16, at 356, 452, 452 n. 13 (describing Clifford as one of "the
poorest opinion-writers ever to sit on the Court," noting that his opinions were "below
standard," and pointing out that its Reporter thought the Court likely to be "better off"
without him).
100. See Tyler, supra n. 21, at 578-608 (reprinting the supplement).
101. See Samuel Tyler to F.M. Etting (Nov. 18, 1870), in Howard Papers, Maryland
Historical Society, Box 10 (showing that Tyler was "much gratified to learn ... that the
Circuit Decisions of Ch. J. Taney [were] about to be published")); see also Swisher, supra
n. 20, at 651-52 (citing R.B. Taney to J. Mason Campbell (Feb. 18, 1861)).
102. R.B. Taney to J. Mason Campbell (Feb. 18, 1861), in Howard Papers, supra n. 101;
see also Swisher, supra n. 20, at 651-52.
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Briefly Back to the Court
There were probably other last-word episodes on the
Supreme Court in the decades before and after the three
imbroglios described above. Justice Miller's embarrassing
attempt to compete with the Court's official reporter of
decisions in the early 1880s might qualify,103 and it may be that
Baldwin's experience with the 1832 case of Ex parte Bradstreet
(in which he was kept in the dark about an order of the Court to
which he had objected)104 was at the root of the fast one he
pulled on his colleagues with A General View. A thorough
sifting of the Court's history, with last words in mind (a task of
lifetimes), might well turn up more. 05
But it may also be the case that decades passed during
which conditions were not right for last-word escapades. For
example, a lull might plausibly be explained by Court culture
and leadership. For most of the Court's existence before the
publication of A General View in 1837, it was led by Chief
Justice Marshall. Maybe his famous success at keeping a lid on
dissenting opinions 6 extended to keeping a lid on the
occasional last-word opinion. And the advent of several decades
of relatively effective administrative leadership (but not
103. See The United States Supreme Court Reporter, Ohio L. J. 527 (June 1, 1882)
(indicating that Justice Miller was in his separately published reports inclined to "make use
of his editorial pen to belabor his fellow judges, and give expression to his chagrin and ill
humor").
104. See Henry Baldwin to Richard Peters (July 21, 1832), reprinted in Ex parte
Bradstreet, 31 U.S. 774, 774 (1832) (Baldwin, J., dissenting).
105. Another possibility is Chief Justice Salmon Chase's maneuvering in the Legal
Tender Cases. Compare J.W. Schuckers, The Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland
Chase 258-273 (Da Capo Press 1970) (reprint of 1874 edition), with William Draper
Lewis, The Legal Tender Cases in 1870, in Miscellaneous Writings of the Late Hon.
Joseph P. Bradley 45, 61-74 (L. J. Hardham 1902) (including "A statement of facts
relating to the order of the Supreme Court of the United States for a re-argument of the
Legal Tender Question, in April, 1870" signed by a majority of the Court sitting in 1870
and filed in response to "a paper filed by the Chief Justice [Salmon Chase] on behalf of
himself and Justices NELSON, CLIFFORD and FIELD. That paper has been withdrawn by
them from the files of the Court, and this is, therefore, not filed."); see also Charles
Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, Volume Three: 1856-1918 at 244-45
(Little, Brown, and Co. 1922).
106. See G. Edward White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70 Va.
L. Rev. 1, 30-47 (1984).
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necessarily jurisprudential leadership) in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries might have made last-word maneuvers
less attractive and more difficult to execute during that period.
The succession of chief justices who headed the Court from
1888 to 1941-Melville W. Fuller, Edward D. White, William
Howard Taft, and Charles Evans Hughes-received generally
high marks from their colleagues (as they have from historians)
for administrative leadership, including the forestalling and
defusing of internal conflicts and crises. 07 Another possibility
involves workload. The apparent lapse in last-word antics began
(in the 1880s) at about the same time that rising caseloads at the
Court and on circuit became an unmanageably large problem,
and it ended not long after Congress wrapped up several decades
of incremental legislation, leading to a docket over which the
Court exercised almost complete control. 08 Docket control,
combined with an infusion of assistants (clerks) to help with the
workload,109 might have liberated some justices to include
among their extracurricular activities the production of last-word
opinions, including the two described below.
For present purposes, it is the persistence of last-word
episodes, not their frequency, that matters most. "Like some
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad," 110 if manifestations of the urge for
the last word ever did in fact lapse, they also did eventually
return.
Felix Frankfurter (1958)
Felix Frankfurter was appointed to the Court by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1939 and served until 1962. He got the
107. Cf Westin, supra n. 64, at 655 ("Why the [general out-of-Court] commentary fell
off so strikingly between 1865 and 1885 and again between 1920 and 1940 is difficult to
explain.").
108. See generally Frankfurter & Landis, supra n. 1, chs. 2-3, 5-7.
109. See J. Daniel Mahoney, Law Clerks: For Better or for Worse? 54 Brook. L. Rev.
321, 322-26 (1988); see generally Todd C. Peppers, Courtiers of the Marble Palace: The
Rise and Influence of the Supreme Court Law Clerk chs. 3-6 (Stanford U. Press 2006).
110. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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last word in Cooper v. Aaron,"' the Little Rock school
desegregation case. Chief Justice Warren announced the opinion
of the Court on September 29. Frankfurter's concurrence
appeared a week later, on October 6. As Frankfurter explained in
a letter written to a friend later that autumn, he concurred
because he felt there were some people-namely "the lawyers
and the law professors of the South"-whom he "was in a
peculiarly qualified position to address in view of my rather
extensive association, by virtue of my twenty-five years at the
Harvard Law School, with a good many Southern lawyers and
law professors."11 2 In other words, Frankfurter thought that there
were lawyers in the South who would follow his lead even if
they wouldn't follow the lead of the Supreme Court.
Frankfurter seems to have been mistaken. There is no
evidence that his concurrence moved any lawyers in the South to
do anything to combat race discrimination that they would not
have done anyway.113 Moreover, the only court to cite his
Cooper concurrence at the time did so to buttress its approval of
a go-slow approach to desegregation in Nashville, Tennessee:
The complaint of appellants is that the plan does not
conform to the mandate that desegregation take place with
all deliberate speed. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in his
concurring opinion in Cooper v. Aaron ... : "Only the
constructive use of time will achieve what an advanced
civilization demands and the Constitution confirms."114
The only reported case in which his concurrence was cited to
support vigorous desegregation in the decade after Cooper was
in the North."' 5 The concurrence has been cited just once in the
111. 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see generally Tony A. Freyer, Cooper v. Aaron (1958): A
Hidden Story of Unanimity and Division, 33 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 89 (March 2008).
112. Hutchinson, supra n. 10, at 84.
113. In this light consider Professor Urofsky's claim that "[ijn fact, Frankfurter knew
very few southern lawyers and had very little correspondence with lawyers practicing
below the Mason-Dixon line," Melvin I. Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter: Judicial Restraint and
Civil Liberties 140 (Twayne Publishers 1991).
114. Kelley v. Bd. ofEduc. ofNashville, 270 F.2d 209, 227 (6th Cir. 1959). Judge Walter
Gewin later cited Frankfurter's concurrence in the course of a critique of an aggressive
desegregation injunction ordered by Judges Richard Rives and Elbert Tuttle. Armstrong v.
Bd. ofEduc. ofthe City ofBirmingham, 323 F.2d 333, 362 (5th Cir. 1963) (Gewin, J.)
115. Taylor v. Bd ofEduc. ofNew Rochelle, 191 F. Supp. 181, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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Supreme Court, as a closing rhetorical flourish to a dissent
written by Justice Brennan in 1990.116
Frankfurter's attempt to build bridges to Southern lawyers
burned or damaged a few bridges closer to home. Several of his
colleagues viewed the concurrence as a betrayal of the Court's
practice of speaking with one voice in desegregation cases."17
Frankfurter was a strong believer in equal rights for African-
Americans, and within the Supreme Court he had played a
prominent role in decisionmaking in that area during the 1940s
and '50s." 8 He was also an energetic and effective supporter of
the Court's strategy of issuing unanimous opinions unqualified
by separate writings, in Brown v. Board of Education and the
desegregation cases that followed it.119 This unanimity, widely
regarded at the time and ever since as "both important and
remarkable,"' 20 was on Frankfurter's mind again when the Court
was dealing with Cooper, in the summer of 1958. On September
19, Frankfurter proposed to his colleagues an even more
emphatic show of solidarity. As Chief Justice Warren recalled,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter called our attention to the fact that
there had been a number of changes in our membership
since Brown v. Board of Education. He suggested that in
order to show we were all in favor of the decision, we
should also say so in the Little Rock case, not in a per
curiam or in an opinion signed by onllI one Justice, but by
an opinion signed by the entire Court.
The other justices agreed, and the September 29 opinion of the
116. Spallone v. US., 493 U.S. 265, 306 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). And perhaps
an ironic flourish at that, given Justice Brennan's opposition to the filing of the Frankfurter
concurrence in the first place. See notes 118-25, infra, and accompanying text.
117. See e.g. James F. Simon, The Antagonists: Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, and
Civil Liberties in Modern America 232-33 (Simon and Schuster 1989); Roger K. Newman,
Hugo Black: A Biography 474-76 (Pantheon Books 1994).
118. See Urofsky, supra n. 113, at 128-47.
119. Id. at 136-37, 142-46; Hutchinson, supra n. 10, at 84.
120. Hutchinson, supra n. 10, at 2.
121. Warren, supra n. It, at 298. Justice Douglas had a different recollection. In what
appears to be an after-the-fact memo to the file Douglas attributes the idea to Justice John
Marshall Harlan. See William 0. Douglas, No. 1-August Special Term, 1958-William
0. Cooper, et al. v. John Aaron, et al., Oct. 8, 1958, at 1, in Douglas Papers, supra n. 10,
Box 1199; see also Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief Earl Warren and His Supreme Court
299-300 (N.Y.U. Press 1983).
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Court in Cooper was issued under the names of all nine
members of the Court.
It was also on September 29 that at least some members of
the Court learned that Frankfurter of all people was planning to
write separately. 122  The justices opted to proceed with
announcement of the opinion of the Court. There was a sense of
urgency. The school year had begun, Justice Harold Burton's
retirement was pending, and the case arose in an atmosphere of
conflict and crisis. And, although they had failed to dissuade
him during their meeting on the 29th, Frankfurter's colleagues
may have thought they could bring him around. After all, he was
a true believer in the desegregation unanimity policy. He was
also wont to think out loud on paper within the confines of the
Court, especially in controversial cases, without taking the final
step of turning those writings into published opinions. Surely
that would be the case in Cooper. Justice Harlan spoke with
Frankfurter privately about the matter. According to Justice
Douglas, during a meeting on Friday, October 3, "[t]he Chief
Justice and Justice Black spoke very stronqly, their feeling being
that his opinion would do damage.' 4 When Frankfurter
persisted, Black and Brennan went so far as to propose a
separate opinion, distancing themselves from Frankfurter's.
They were dissuaded by some combination of a negative vote by
the other justices and a tongue-in-cheek counter-counter opinion
proposed by Harlan.' 2 5
Frankfurter released his opinion without fanfare and to little
acclaim other than some fan mail. 126 Nevertheless, Warren
would later recall that it "caused quite a sensation on the Court,
122. Hutchinson, supra n. 10, at 82 & 82 n. 702 (quoting Burton, J., Diary, Sept. 29,
1958, Box 4, Harold H. Burton Papers, Lib. of Cong., Manuscript Div.).
123. See e.g. Felix Frankfurter, F.F. 's Soliloquy, 5 Green Bag 2d 438 (2002)
(memorandum to the Conference circulated by Frankfurter, on October 23, 1942, six days
before announcement of the opinion of the Court in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), the
Nazi saboteurs case); Urofsky, supra n. 113, at 130-31 (describing similar episode in the
case of Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)).
124. See Douglas Papers, supra n. 10, at Box 1199.
125. See Appendix 1, infra, for both the Black-Brennan proposal and the Harlan
proposal.
126. See e.g. Kim Isaac Eisler, A Justice for All: William J. Brennan, Jr., and the
Decisions that Transformed America 155 (Simon & Schuster 1993).
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because it was our invariable practice not to announce the
decision in any case until all of our views had been
expressed." 27 Professor Schwartz reports that Frankfurter's play
for a last word in Cooper marked the end of Warren's
confidence in Frankfurter, a development which harmed not
only their personal relations, but also their capacity to
collaborate on opinions.' 2 8 The Warren-Frankfurter relationship,
personal and professional, had been on the decline for several
years, but the Cooper imbroglio appears to have been the last
straw.
In sum, Frankfurter's play for the last word in Cooper
netted at least two costs-a little bit of aid and comfort for some
opponents of speedy desegregation (recall Baldwin), and an end
to (or at least a decline in) constructive work between two
members of the Supreme Court (recall Taney and Curtis)-and
no benefits.
William 0. Douglas (1973)
William 0. Douglas also was appointed to the Court by
Roosevelt in 1939. He retired in 1975. As Professor Murphy has
shown in compelling detail, Douglas invoked "independence"
throughout his thirty-six-year tenure not only as the basis for his
distinctive approach to his work as a judge, but also as an excuse
for his distinctively rude and occasionally dishonest dealings
with his colleagues. 129 Douglas's sense of independence was on
display in his opposition to United States military involvement
in Southeast Asia throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s,
when he did everything in his power as a judge to slow or stop
the Vietnam War-including repeated attempts to coax his
colleagues on the Court into ruling on the lawfulness of various
127. Warren, supra n. 11, at 298-99; see also Simon, supra n. 117, at 232.
128. Schwartz, supra n. 121, at 305; see also Urofsky, supra n. 113, at 146-47
(reporting that after a period of "pariah" status, in the words of Brennan, most of the
justices "made their peace" with Frankfurter, "but not Earl Warren").
129. See e.g. Bruce Allen Murphy, Wild Bill 353-54, 471-72 (Random House 2003).
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aspects of the conflict.' 30 All to little avail, but to considerable
public controversy.'3 1
Finally, in early August 1973, Douglas saw an opportunity
to stop the war all by himself.
In July 1973, Elizabeth Holtzman (a Member of the House
of Representatives) and several Air Force officers filed suit in a
New York federal district court seeking a permanent injunction
against United States air operations in Cambodia. The district
court gave them their remedy, but postponed it for a few days to
give the government time to seek review (or at least a stay of the
injunction pending review) in the Second Circuit. The Second
Circuit granted the government's request for a stay, and set the
case for prompt argument. Holtzman et al. applied to Justice
Thurgood Marshall in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the
Second Circuit, seeking an order vacating the appellate court's
stay and thus triggering the district court's injunction. On
August 1, Marshall denied the application. 3 2 On August 3,
Douglas, to whom Holtzman's attorneys had applied after being
denied by Marshall,133 held a public hearing on the application
at the Yakima (Washington) County Courthouse, and then
vacated the Second Circuit's stay and restored the district
court's injunction.13 4
But as Douglas knew, his colleagues on the Court had
resolutely avoided deep entanglement in policy issues related to
the war.13 5  On August 4, Douglas issued an opinion to
accompany his August 3 order, even as the Solicitor General
130. See e.g. id. at 415-19.
131. See id chs. 33, 35, 36; see also H.R. Spec. Subcomm. on H. Res. 920, Final
Report, 91st Cong. 61-65 (1970) (containing copies of letters written by Representative F.
Edward Hdbert in August 1969 to Chief Justice Burger and Solicitor General Erwin
Griswold asking that Douglas be disqualified in cases relating to the Vietnam War, and
Burger and Griswold's replies).
132. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973) (Marshall, J., in chambers); see
also John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its
Aftermath 34-35, 40-43 (Princeton U. Press 1993).
133. See Burt Neuborne to William 0. Douglas, Aug. 1, 1973, in Douglas Papers, supra
n. 10, Box 1639.
134. See Order, A-150 Holtzman v. Schlesinger (Aug. 3, 1973) (Douglas, J., in
chambers), in Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Lib. of Cong., Manuscript Div., Box 172
[hereinafter "Blackmun Papers"]; Murphy, supra n. 129, at 461-62.
135. See e.g. Drifka v. Brainard, 2 Rapp 416 (1968) (Douglas, J., in chambers).
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was presenting Marshall with an application to stay the order of
the district court that Douglas had just restored. Marshall
granted the stay, thus frustrating Douglas's effort to halt the
war.136 But Marshall went further. He concluded his stay by
communicating the entire Court's disapproval of Douglas's
decision:
I have been in communication with the other Members of
the Court, and The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr.
Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Blackmun,
Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist agree with
thi 137this action.13
It was this last passage that really disappointed Douglas.
Professor Murphy reports: .'I expected to be overturned,'
Douglas told [his secretary Marty] Bagby cheerfully, 'but I
didn't think it would happen so fast. I really wanted a full
hearing, but at least I got my say."' 138
In print, though, Douglas responded angrily to Marshall
and the other members of the Court who had sided with him.
Douglas issued a "dissent" to Marshall's opinion, even though
Marshall was writing "in chambers," meaning that his opinion
expressed only his decision and opinion as an individual Circuit
justice, not as an associate justice writing an opinion of the
Court. Douglas complained, first, that Marshall lacked the
power as Circuit justice to deny Douglas the last word, and,
second, that the Court lacked the power to deny him the last
word when they conferred by telephone (a measure taken by
Marshall to reach justices who were not able to meet in
Washington during the Court's summer recess 39) rather than in
136. See Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321 (1973) (Marshall, J., in chambers).
137. Id. at 1322.
138. Murphy, supra n. 129, at 464. Of course, as a Supreme Court justice, he could have
his say any time he wanted to, and had in fact done so on several occasions. See e.g.
Winters v. U S., 2 Rapp 410 (1968) (Douglas, J., in chambers); Drifka v. Brainard, 2 Rapp
416 (1968) (Douglas, J., in chambers); Noyd v. Bond, 2 Rapp 418 (1968) (Douglas, J., in
chambers).
139. At least a few of the justices met in conference at the Supreme Court building. See
1973 Datebook, in Blackmun Papers, supra n. 134, Box 60 (Saturday, Aug. 4, entry: "Conf
in S re Cambodia papers").
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person.140 He then went on to explain his objection, in language
reminiscent of Justice Daniel's and Justice Curtis's:
A Conference brings us all together; views are exchanged;
briefs are studied; oral argument by counsel for each side is
customarily required. But even without participation the
Court always acts in Conference and therefore
responsibly....
I have participated for enough years in Conferences to
realize that profound changes are made among the Brethren
once their minds are allowed to explore a problem in
depth....
Whatever may be said on the merits, I am firmly
convinced that the telephonic disposition of this grave and
crucial constitutional issue is not permissible. I do not
speak of social propriety. It is a matter of law and order
involving high principles. The principles are that the Court
is a deliberative body that acts only on reasoned bases after
full consideration, and that it is as much bound by the law
of the land as is he who lives in the ghetto or in the big
white house on the hill. With all respect I think the Court
has slighted that law. The short-cut it has taken today surely
flouts an Act of Congress providing for a necessary
141quorum.
Douglas's defense of the Court's deliberative processes
rings true. But as the catalytic agent for Marshall's quickie
orchestration of a firm end to his attempt to have the last word
on the Cambodian bombing campaign, Douglas was not well-
positioned with respect to the judicial high ground. 142
In other words, Douglas's decision to vacate the Second
Circuit's stay even though he "expected to be overturned" may
well have been viewed by his colleagues as a lawless act-
especially if they knew of his expectation-because, as Marshall
140. Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. at 1322-24 (Douglas, J., in chambers,
"dissenting").
141. Id. at 1323-24.
142. See Murphy, supra n. 129, at 464-65. In addition, Douglas was uniquely
experienced in the hazards of procedural brinksmanship at the Supreme Court, having
played a central role in 1953 in the most famous modem episode involving that sort of
behavior. See Brad Snyder, Taking Great Cases: Lessons from the Rosenberg Case, 63
Vand. L. Rev. 885, 913-20 (2010).
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said in his first Holtzman opinion,
[a] Circuit Justice . . . bears a heavy responsibility to
conscientiously reflect the views of his Brethren as best he
perceives them, cf. Meridith [sic] v. Fair, 83 S. Ct. 10, 11
(1962) (Black, J., Circuit Justice), and this responsibility is
particularly pressing when, as now, the Court is not in
session.14 3
But Douglas seemingly knew, or at least believed, he was flout-
ing the views of his colleagues, and had instead used Holtzman
as a personal vehicle through which to "have my say" in a case
even he, perhaps the strongest supporter on the Court of con-
gressional and judicial power to restrain the president in this
context, expected Holtzman to lose. (Indeed, Marshall seems to
have paid more attention to Holtzman's arguments, and to have
been more sanguine about her prospects for success on the me-
rits, than Douglas did or was.) Which was the more dangerous
precedent, Marshall and the other Justices might have been ask-
ing themselves: (a) to bow to one Circuit Justice (Douglas) who
uses the stay power as a means of self-expression without regard
to the views or interests of other members of the Court, thus set-
ting a dangerous precedent for future rogue decisions, or (b) to
permit one Circuit Justice (Marshall) to re-impose a stay vacated
by another Circuit Justice (Douglas) rather than honoring the
decision to vacate pending a hearing by the full Court, thus set-
ting a dangerous precedent for future dueling vacations and
stays? Reasonable minds could differ. Those of Marshall, Burg-
er, Brennan, Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist
seemingly did not. All opted for (b).
At first blush, this latest last-word episode appears to be a
relatively low-cost incident, at least compared to some of the
others described in this article. There was no upside for Douglas.
He did not get what he said he wanted: a hearing. But there was
no immediate harm done-Douglas was just being the same old
obnoxious independent, and the procedurally slippery maneuver
Marshall had used did not have any noticeable impact on the
Court's jurisprudence or on inter-branch relations.
143. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. at 1313 (Marshall, J., in chambers).
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But there may have been longer-term costs for Douglas,
and for the Court. Having once prompted the other eight
members of the Court to confer outside his presence
(telephonically or otherwise) in order to prevent his
independence from frustrating the work of the Court, Douglas
had set a precedent, or at least marked the channel, for those
eight to meet again when next he stepped beyond the pale. And
that next time would come in October 1975, when the other
eight justices would vote in secret to deny him a vote in five-to-
four decisions by the Court'"-a far more serious challenge to
the Court's tradition of "always act[ing] in Conference and
therefore responsibly." 45
Finally, even the independent Justice Douglas never again
tried to get the last word on Vietnam, or anything else, at the
expense of his fellow justices. He probably would have been
irritated to learn that his Holtzman opinion has been cited just
once in a case involving the military. It was in a concurrence to
a decision denying members of Congress standing to seek a
declaration that a president had violated the war powers clause
of the Constitution, for the proposition that "[a ellants cannot
point to any constitutional test for what is war.
Back-Again Briefly-to the Court
There could be more recent last-word cases. For example, it
has been suggested that not all of the justices saw all of the
opinions in Bush v. Gore before they were issued.147 But it will
be many years before we can check. Indeed, the sample set of
last-word opinions will probably always be stale, because the
clues will often be in memories that fade and eventually
disappear and files that tend to be opened to the public at a time
only long (and getting longer) after the event.14 8 Alas, it is
144. See Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables of Supreme Judicial
Disqualfication, 10 Green Bag 2d 79, 88-89 (2006).
145. Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. at 1323 (Douglas, J. "dissenting").
146. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring).
147. See White, supra n. 7, at 1504 n. 159.
148. See e.g. Tony Mauro, Souter Blocks Access to His Papers for 50 Years, 240 Leg.
Intelligencer 4 (Aug. 28, 2009).
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impossible to learn the lessons of history when the history is
secret.
PART II
A. Why So Few Last Words?
The reasons why individual justices do not return to the
well of last words are probably pretty obvious by now. There are
two of them. First, the last word does not work. From Baldwin's
attempt to turn a buck to McLean's attempt to pump up his
presidential prospects to Taney's attempt to make America safe
for slavery to Frankfurter's attempt to make his Harvard
acolytes make the South safe for desegregation to Douglas's
attempt to end the Vietnam War, every last-word justice was
reminded that the justices' great public power comes from their
membership in a respected institution, not from any personal
genius or influence. And when a justice, even a chief justice,
attempts to convert the Court into a vehicle of self-expression,
the other members of the Court tend to band together in
opposition, regardless of how divided they may be on the
underlying legal issues. Second, the last word is costly, in
individual and (at least some of the time) institutional terms.
Members of the Court and, at times, outsiders, are not afraid to
sanction justices who attempt to grab more than their share of
supreme judicial power. And both the grab itself and the
collegial sanctions that follow can harm the Court as an
institution.
Why, then have justices continued-albeit only very
occasionally-to attempt to draw from an illusory well of
authority that has so consistently disserved their predecessors?
Any plausible answer must begin with an understanding of the
intentions of the justices involved. With the possible exception
of Baldwin-whose intentions are the most obscure and whose
distance from modern judicial mores is the greatest-they have
sought to serve the public by their "own peculiar lights," and
have fouled it up. Consider the following possibilities:
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1. Perhaps They Are Ignorant of History.
All Supreme Court justices are, to some extent, students of
the history of the Court in general, and of their predecessors in
particular.' 49 Professional responsibility calls for it, even if
native curiosity doesn't do the job. But that does not mean that
they know about these rare, unhappy, and understandably under-
celebrated events. Lacking awareness of how ineffectual and
harmful past efforts to get the last word have been, they cannot
weigh those experiences when choosing their own courses of
action. They are doomed.150 In some cases, at least, this rationale
is probably unduly charitable. McLean, Taney, and Douglas, for
example, had while serving on the Court witnessed last-word
frolics by at least one colleague before they engaged in similar
acts themselves.
2. Perhaps They Feel a Sense of National Crisis.
Theirs are cases of special importance, arising at
149. See e.g. William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is
(William Morrow & Co., Inc. 1987); Harry A. Blackmun, The Story-Holmes Seat, 2 J.
Sup. Ct. Hist. 11 (1996); but see Josiah M. Daniel, III, Historians as Justices of the
Supreme Court, posted to American Society for Legal History, H-Net and HSLH Legal
History Discussion List, http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list-H-Law&
month=1102&week-b&msg-J2/CVdEm8yajTejBB45GFQ&user-&pw- (Feb. 11, 2011)
(accessed Apr. 1, 2011; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process):
I have two small anecdotes germane to the topic of "historians as Supreme
Court justices," or rather to the interest of two justices in history. Both occurred
during my law school days at the University of Texas.
First, in the fall of 1975, William Rehnquist, then on the bench for four
years, visited the law school and at a reception in the Tom Clark Lounge, I asked
him whether, since he took the bench, he was reading U.S. history, in particular
the AHR or the Journal of American History, and he answered "I regret that I no
longer have time to do so." He did have two M.A.s in poli sci and government,
which, as is noted from time to time on this list, is a sort of a distant cousin to
legal history.
Second, in the spring of 1978, 1 had the opportunity to spend an hour with
Tom Clark in the Faculty Lounge at the law school. Back then I was a maestro
of Supreme Court trivia, and I tried out every trivia question I could muster and
Clark knew them all. He said he had put a lot of time into learning about the his-
tory of the Court after he stepped down ten years earlier.
150. George Santayana, The Life of Reason vol. 1 (titled Introduction and Reason in
Common Sense) at 284 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1920) ("Those who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it.").
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extraordinary times. Past last-word cases have involved some of
the most important and controversial issues of their respective
days. Baldwin was addressing federal versus state power as the
nation was making the transition to a Jacksonian democracy.
McLean and Taney were addressing slavery, Frankfurter
segregation, and Douglas Vietnam. Some justices do appear to
have believed that notwithstanding the importance of consistent
application in the courts of general rules-to justice, the rule of
law, the efficiency of social relations, the reputation of the
judiciary, and so on-some circumstances call for judicial action
that Justice Owen Roberts once contemptuously described as
being of "the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for
this day and train only."' 5' Even a Taney or Douglas who had
witnessed the consequences of the pursuit of the last word-and
thus for whom ignorance of history could be no excuse-might
choose to act arbitrarily if the stakes were high enough. That
justice could cite Abraham Lincoln and William Rehnquist,
among others, for support.152
3. Or Perhaps It Is More a Sense ofInstitutional Crisis.
Baldwin and McLean acted during the difficult early years
of the Taney Court, when the institution was working its way
out of the shadow of John Marshall. Taney, Frankfurter, and
Douglas shared a different relationship to the institution of the
Court: They found themselves seeking the last word toward the
ends of long and distinguished careers. Some of the most
eminent members of the Court, as well as lesser lights, have
151. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting); see also
Wash. Co. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 183 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Roberts
dissent in Smith); Sorchini v. City of Covina, 250 F.3d 706, 708 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2001) (per
curiam) ("This excuse is valid only in this case. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 ...
(2000).").
152. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in The
Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln vol. 4 at 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed. Abraham
Lincoln Assn. 1953) (addressing suspension of habeas corpus in times of rebellion or
invasion); William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime 165,
218 (Alfred A. Knopf 1998) (pointing out that "[w]ithout question the government's
authority to engage in conduct that infringes civil liberty is greatest in time of declared
war" and that "insurrection could be treated by the government as the equivalent of a
declared war").
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shown a tendency toward personal judicial apocalypsism in their
old age. Chief Justice William Howard Taft, for example, wrote
to his brother that, "I must stay on the court in order to prevent
the Bolsheviki from getting control." 5 3 In his waning days even
John Marshall succumbed to the sense that the younger
generation lacked the strength and judgment of their
forebears.154 More recently Justices Douglas and Blackmun
expressed similar concerns. 5 Saving the Court might not be
quite the same as saving the nation, but it would still count as a
high calling justifying, perhaps, extraordinary measures.
4. Which Leads to the Fourth Possibility: Perhaps They Feel a
Sense ofPersonal Mission.
Perhaps there are special justices endowed with capabilities
or characteristics that make their voices more powerful or useful
than the institutional voice of the Court-or at least justices who
think they are so blessed and burdened. This possibility seems
closest to the surface in the most recent cases. Frankfurter, with
his strangely self-absorbed and self-important belief that a
prominent Harvard man such as himself could speak-over the
heads of less influential justices-to his fellow sophisticates of
good will in the South and bring about a massive social change
that had exceeded the grasp of lesser Americans. Perhaps his
153. William Howard Taft to Horace D. Taft, Nov. 14, 1929, quoted in Henry F. Pringle,
The Life and Times of William Howard Taft vol. 2 at 967 (Farrar & Rinehart 1939).
According to Professor Wiecek, "[tihe Bolsheviks he had in mind were Justices Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Louis D. Brandeis, and Harlan Fiske Stone." William M. Wiecek, The
Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The Background of Dennis v. United
States, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 375, 393. See also Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard
Taft: Chief Justice 295 (Simon and Schuster 1965); Ross E. Davies, A Certain Mongrel
Court: Congress's Past Power and Present Potential to Reinforce the Supreme Court, 90
Minn. L. Rev. 678, 712 (2006) (pointing out that some members of the Court have seemed
to "find it difficult to imagine justice prevailing in their absence, thereby making it their
duty to remain on the Court as long as physically possible").
154. John Marshall to Joseph Story (Sept. 22, 1832), quoted in Albert J. Beveridge, The
Life of John Marshall vol. 4, at 559 (Standard Library 1919); see also Herbert A. Johnson,
The ChiefJusticeship ofJohn Marshall, 1801-1835 at 261 (U. of S.C. Press 1997).
155. See e.g. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922-23, 943
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting
in part); Murphy, supra n. 129, at 481-95; James F. Simon, Independent Journey: The Life
of William 0. Douglas 447-54 (Harper & Row 1980).
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long service on the Court had fostered an illusion that people
hung on his every word because they were Justice Frankfurter's
words, when in fact it was because they were Justice
Frankfurter's words. Were it otherwise, an inspirational essay on
desegregation by any respected and long-serving member of the
Harvard Law faculty would have served as well. And Douglas,
with his no-holds-barred, judicio-guerrilla warfare with the
executive branch over the Vietnam War, believing perhaps that
only a truly independent man-a Supreme Court Rambo-could
lead the country and the world to freedom from the aggressions
and machinations of an evil, imperial President and his
henchmen. (Cue Darth Vader theme music.)
5. Perhaps They Are Not Calculating the Costs and Benefits in
the Way This Article Suggests They Should.
The fact that the benefits of pursuing the last word are
illusory or at least highly improbable might be of little moment
to a justice for whom the costs are extremely low. A Baldwin or
Douglas, for example-whose relations with colleagues were
already generally poor, and whose public behavior suggested
that they either did not see or did not care about the possibility
that their behavior as individuals might harm the institution of
which they were a part-might conclude that the costs of getting
the last word are vanishingly close to zero. They might be
mistaken, as in the case of Douglas, where his eight adversaries
banded together again a couple of years later, but that sort of
development would be even harder to anticipate and evaluate.
Under those circumstances, the likely ineffectuality of the last
word would appear to such a justice to merely mean a near-zero
benefit on the other side of the equation from what to them
would appear to be a certainly-zero cost.
6. Closely Entwined with the Preceding Is the Possibility of a
Judicial End-Period Problem.
Recall that three of the five justices whose last-word efforts
we have reviewed were near the end of long and prominent
careers on the Court. A justice imbued with a sense of crisis (the
second and third possibilities above) or self-importance (the
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fourth possibility) might well decide to fall on his or her sword:
I am going to retire or die soon, so the costs to me (and perhaps
also to the institution, to the extent I can attract the costs to
myself) will be low, and while the benefits are both speculative
and improbable, there is no (or at least very little) harm in
trying, especially in light of the gravity of the situation.
Noblesse oblige. A sense of devil-may-care (the fifth possibility)
would only further ease the way down the path of this rationale.
B. And What of Last Words Anyway?
Whatever a justice's motives for getting the last word may
be in a particular instance-and surely there are other
possibilities not covered herel 56 -the question of what to do
about them remains. There is no obvious predictor. For each of
the possibilities offered above, there are, obviously, many more
examples of justices who did not respond by seeking the last
word than there are of justices who did.
PART III
There is no last-word crisis. Last-word opinions are
wasteful and potentially worse, but at least in their historical
forms they do not pose a profound or pressing threat to truth,
justice, or the American way. In fact, the most striking
implication of this essay may be that justices engage in this sort
of behavior only rarely. Why are they so well-behaved? The
answer is beyond the scope of this article, but it is comforting to
have such a long history of temptation so very nearly
consistently resisted. Thus, talk of constitutional amendments,
impeachments, inspectors general, and the like would be out of
place. Besides, there are plenty of other things that need fixing
too. So, the focus here is on relatively cheap and easy solutions
to a small but interesting and potentially fixable problem.
Before turning to solutions, though, recall the experiences
of past last-word justices. Those experiences can be seen as
156. For example, one thoughtful reader of an earlier draft pointed out that pride might
be a factor: "Hubris.... Some Justices are simply blinded by ego."
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having two aspects: market-feedback, and tit-for-tat. The
relevant markets-in book sales, political support, desirable
citations, and so on-have valued last-word opinions at zero, or
less. And justices who invade institutional or individual
prerogatives at the Court when seeking the last word have been
apt to experience retaliation sufficiently sharp to deter a second
intrusion. The effectiveness of these forces seems satisfactory.
No one has tried for a second last word.
Thus, the only problem that needs solving is the first act.
Such acts can be costly-the loss of a great talent such as Justice
Curtis, or the unintended provision of justifications for
prolonging racial segregation, and so on-but unpredictably so.
And as explained in Part II above, the obvious explanations for
last-word outbreaks are not useful predictors of future events.
What is needed, then, is a low-cost general deterrent or
prophylactic. But how to deter or neuter a Supreme Court
justice?
Article III of the Constitution is a powerfully liberating
law. Federal judges holding office under that provision of the
Constitution are free to do as they please, subject only to never-
enforced requirements of "good Behaviour" in office' 5 7 and
adherence to an "Oath or Affirmation" to support the
Constitution,15 8 and "remov[al] from Office on Impeachment
for, and Conviction of Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors."' Acting directly against justices seeking
the last word seems to be out of the question. They are
essentially free, under Article III, to do as they please.
Consider first the possibility of some limited action against
the justices themselves:
A. The Justices Could Adopt a Rule Forbidding Last-Word
Opinions.
Perhaps something modeled on Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29.1, under which the prosecutor, who has the burden
157. U.S. Const., art. III, § 1.
158. U.S. Const., art. VI.
159. U.S. Const., art. II, § 4.
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of proof, gets the last word. After all, they routinely permit
themselves to be subject to other constraints. But they are the
constraints of tyrants. Thus, for example, Supreme Court Rule
42 (which in 1857 provided that "all opinions hereafter
delivered by the court shall immediately upon the delivery
thereof be ... delivered over to the clerk to be recorded") failed
to constrain Taney. Admonitions and even threats by his
colleagues failed to sway Frankfurter. Douglas flouted
established Supreme Court practice. By the same token, acting
directly against the last-word actions of justices seeking the last
word also seems to be out of the question. They can be
nullified-as, for example, Douglas's were in the Holtzman
litigation-but they cannot be stopped.
B. They Could Establish a Practice, Like the Rule ofFour for
Granting Petitions for Certiorari, Barring Last- Word Opinions
without Permission from, Say, a Majority ofJustices.
This approach has the appeal of precedent. Recall that it
was used, at least informally, on a few occasions in the 1940s.16 0
More recent experience suggests, however, that a practice of this
sort would be no more effective than a rule of the sort described
in subsection A above. It runs the risk of triggering destructive
game-playing under precisely the kinds of stressful
circumstances that it might be adopted to address.16 1
Then there is the possibility of action not against last-word
justices, but against their words. The decisions and opinions of
the Court belong to the Court as an institution, as do the official
reports of those decisions. Consider the following:
C. They Could Adopt an Interpretive Rule NulliJing Last- Word
Opinions.
There are a variety of ways the Court might achieve this
end. Perhaps the most straightforward would be to extend the
160. See supra n. 10.
161. See e.g. Edward Lazarus, Closed Chambers 157-65 (Random House 1998)
(describing the institutional stresses triggered by conflicts among the justices involving
various internal three-, four-, and five-vote rules).
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Court's holding in Nguyen v. United Statesl62 that an opinion
issued by an "improperly constituted" federal court of appeals is
a nullity.163 The majority in Nguyen emphasized the "strong
policy concerning the proper administration of judicial business"
embodied in the statute defining membership on a panel of the
court of appeals.'" The same argument could be made-as
Justice Douglas said in Holtzman-that the quorum requirement
for the Court precludes any one justice from purporting to speak
as a member of the Court without first deliberating in the
company of at least a quorum-minus-one of her or his
colleagues. After all, by long practice at the very least, no one-
not even a freelancing justice-can bar a justice from
participating in the work of the Court. In addition, there is
precedent from the Supreme Court itself for ignoring late-
breaking opinions.' 66 On this reasoning, a last-word opinion
might be the work of a person whose day job is being an
associate or chief justice serving on the Supreme Court of the
United States, but that piece of writing would not be written in
her or his capacity as a member of the Court unless it had been
timely circulated to at least a quorum-minus-one of the Court.
The problem here, of course, is that clever gymnastics with
precedents established for other purposes-in the case of
Nguyen, the supervision of inferior courts by the Supreme
Court-can open a Pandora's Box. In this case, the potential for
destructive game-playing under a Nguyen-based rule would be
much the same as the potential under the kind of rule or practice
162. 539 U.S. 69 (2003).
163. Id. at 82.
164. Id. at 78 (quoting Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 536 (1962)).
165. See e.g. William H. Rehnquist, C.J. of the U.S., to Patrick Leahy, U.S. Sen. (Jan.
26, 2004), reprinted in Irrecusable & Unconfirnable, 7 Green Bag 2d 277, 280 (2004)
(pointing out that "[a] Justice must examine the question of recusal on his own"); see also
supra n. 131.
166. See e.g. US. v. King, 48 U.S. 833, 846 (1849):
In this case, there is a statement by the judge who decided the case, containing
his opinion both on the facts and the law, and which is attached to the record,
and has been sent up with it. But this opinion appears to have been filed, not
only after the suit had been ended by a final judgment, but after a writ of error
had been served removing the case to this court. This statement of the judge
cannot, therefore, be regarded as part of the record of the proceedings in the
Circuit Court, which the writ of error brings up, and cannot therefore be resorted
to as a statement of the case.
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described in subsections A and B above. On the other hand, a
Nguyen-based rule would generally postpone final determination
of the status of a last-word opinion until the question of its status
and authority arose in a later case. By then, the crisis under
which the last-word opinion appeared might well have passed,
and cooler reflection from a distance might present a solution.
D. Or Congress Could Step in, and Somehow Neutralize
Last- Word Opinions.
Congress might, for example, enact a law denying
precedential effect to any opinion in a case issued after the
opinion of the Court in that case. With of course, room for
technical and typographical corrections. 16 Professor Paulsen has
made a widely noted proposal for legislative abolition of judicial
stare decisis in constitutional cases. 168 Aside from the larger
questions of the constitutionality of such an approach, there is
the more straightforward question: Would such a dramatic and
potentially damaging approach be worth the benefits of avoiding
a few last-word dust-ups? Better, perhaps, to have a few last-
word opinions out there than a world in which Congress is
treating every American as it treated Terri Schiavo.
167. See, for example, the cover of any preliminary print of the United State Reports, all
of which feature these words on the front cover:
Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the bound volume goes to
press.
See also e.g. Tony Mauro, Breyer's "I" Scream, 22 Leg. Times 1 (Apr. 26, 1999) (noting
that Justice Breyer once used "I" when announcing a decision of the Court). Justice Breyer
should take some consolation from the very good company in which this incident puts him.
See e.g. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 31, 32 (1801) (Marshall, C.J.); US. v. Schooner Peggy,
5 U.S. 103, 110 (1801) (Marshall, C.J.).
168. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute, 109 Yale L.J.
1535 (2000); De-precedenting Roe, 3 Green Bag 2d 347 (2000); but see Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570 (2001); see also Martin H.
Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46
Mercer L. Rev. 697 (1995).
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E. And, Finally, a Narrow Solution that the Court Could Adopt
without the Spillover Problems ofProposals C and D or the
Game-Playing Risks ofProposals A and B.
The Court could, by rule or practice, treat writings of
justices issued in a case after the date on which the opinion of
the Court in that case is announced as the work of an individual
judge rather than the Court, unless notice of those forthcoming
words is included in the opinion of the Court. They could be
published in the back of the United States Reports, in the section
currently reserved for in-chambers opinions of individual
justices sitting as Circuit justices.
This is not as odd as it might sound. There is some
institutional precedent. The Court did not routinely publish the
in-chambers opinions of the justices sitting as Circuit justices
until recently. Before the late 1960s, justices interested in seeing
their in-chambers opinions in print made their own arrangements
with journalists or commercial case reporters. The implicit
assumption was that the United States Reports were reserved for
the work of the justices sitting, as Douglas said in Holtzman, as
a "deliberative body."l 69 Frankfurter and Douglas campaigned
on and off throughout the 1950s and '60s for the inclusion of in-
chambers opinions in the United States Reports, but without
success. Chief Justices Fred Vinson and Earl Warren did not act,
and on at least one occasion the Court informally rejected the
idea. It was not until Chief Justice Warren Burger came along
that they made it in.170 In-chambers opinions have been treated
by the justices as persuasive authority in the past, and there is no
reason why they could not do the same for last-word opinions. It
would put last words in their proper place. 7 1 It would be very
nearly cost-free, and it might work.
169. Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. at 1323-24 (Douglas, J., in chambers,
"dissenting").
170. See Matetsky, supra n. 5, at x-xv.
171. The Court could also signal its adoption of such a rule by retrospectively applying
it to, at least, Baldwin's A General View, which did not appear in the official reports until




Justice Robert Jackson famously observed in Brown v.
Allen that, "We are not final because we are infallible, but we
,172are infallible only because we are final." A justice seeking the
last word undermines that finality, and therefore also the Court's
legal infallibility. Is there really majority support for the
reasoning as well as the result in a case decided five to four, or
might some belated fit of self-expression-the spirit of Baldwin
and McLean and Frankfurter-take hold of one of the five in the
majority? If it does, what then is the law of that case?17 3 Is the
majority opinion in a case really a majority opinion, or might its
author (with the support of enough colleagues) re-write it at a
later date, as Taney did once and tried to do twice in Dred Scott?
And when (and to what effect) will a justice frustrated by the
timidity of his colleagues-and following in the footsteps of
Douglas-settle on equitable relief issued in chambers as the
only path to an outcome he or she deeply desires? And so on.
In a last-word world we can never know the answers to
these questions, and so also can never know for certain what the
law is. Justice Daniel recognized this problem more than 150
years ago in the Passenger Cases.174  Occasionally and
unfortunately, a few of his predecessors, colleagues, and
successors were not privy to his insight, or perhaps they forgot
about it in their moments of urgency. And then there are all the
other costs described ad nauseam above.
The Supreme Court and those governed by its judgments
do not need this sort of trouble, not even once in a very great
while. It would be nice if the Court, with or without the help of
Congress, did something about it.
172. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J. concurring).
173. To get a sense of the impact such an opinion might have, consider Justice Powell's
opinion in Regents of U of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978). See e.g. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 321-23 (2003) ("Since this Court's splintered decision in Bakke,
Justice Powell's opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has served as the
touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies.").
174. 48 U.S. at 515-16 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
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APPENDIX 1
believe that the jofat opiaies d
all the justices handed down on September 29, 1958
adequately expresses the views of this Court, and they
stand by that opinion as delivered. They dealse that it
be fully understood that the concurring ogiatestied
this day by Mr. Justice Frantrter must set be assepted
as any dilution or interpretation of the views expressed
In the Court's joint opinion.
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[October 6, 195S.]
Ma. JUSTICE HARLAN concurring in part, expressing a
dubitante in part. and dissenting in part.
I concur in the Court's opinion, filed September 29,
1958. in which I have already concurred. I doubt the
wisdom of my Brother FRANKFURTER filing his separate
opinion, but since I am unable to find any material
difference bsetween that opinion and the Court's opinion-
and am confirmed in my reading of the former by my
Brother FRANKFURTER'S express reaffirmation of the lat-
ter-I am content to leave his course of action to his own
good judgment. I dissent from the action of my other
Brethren in filing their separate opinion. believing that
it is always a mistake to make a mountain out of a
molehill. Requiesat in pace.
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